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I.

INTRODUCTION:

STATUS

GREENAWALT

AND
UNDER

THE

CLAUSES

RECENT

TESTS

UNDER

THE RELIGION

CLAUSES

As the 1994 termdrewto a close, "tests"forthe Religion
Clauses werein nearlytotaldisarray.Apartfromcases of discriminationagainstreligions,and disputesover churchproperty,
a student of the SupremeCourt's jurisprudencecould not formulate
any generalteststhata majorityof theJusticesclearlysupport.As
is forthosewho welcomeuncertainty
excitingas thisstateofaffairs
and change,it is disquietingforlawyersand clients,forjudgeswho
must decide free exerciseand establishment
claims,and for Suwho
Court
to
stable
Justices
preme
aspire
principlesof adjudicaIn
I
tion. thisessay, providea summaryaccountof how the Court,
withsome "help" fromCongress,has arrivedat the presentjuncture,and I commenton possiblelines of development.
For two decades up to 1990, adjudicationunder the Religion
Clauses exhibiteda remarkable,thoughfragile,stability.The SupremeCourt had arrivedat basic testsforboth the Free Exercise
and the EstablishmentClauses. For freeexercisecases, the basic
standardwas the compellinginteresttest: a law interfering
with
someone'sexerciseof religioncould be appliedagainstthe person
interestthatcould not
onlyif it serveda compellinggovernment
be achievedby a less restrictive
means. For establishment
cases,
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the basic standardwas the threefoldtestof Lemonv Kurtzman:'a
law was valid only if it was backed by a secularpurpose,did not
have a primaryeffectthatpromotedor inhibitedreligion,and did
not undulyentanglethe government
withreligion.For cases inwhich give rise to both
volvingoutrightreligiousclassifications,
free exerciseand establishmentobjections,the Court used the
compellinginteresttest.
Those who possessedsome familiarity
withtheCourt'sdecisions
realizedthatany statementof applicabletestsobscuredtroubling
complexities.
The Court demandedless in the way of justification
to satisfy
the freeexercisecompellinginteresttestthanit requiredwhen it
reviewedracial classifications
and infringements
on freespeech.
when
the
Court
discovered
a
it
(However,
religiousclassification,
treatedit as "suspect"and demandeda highlevel ofjustification.2)
In certaininstancesforwhichthe testseemedrelevant,the Court
avoidedapplyingit altogether,
and in otherinstancesit statedthat
claimantshad not satisfiedthresholdrequirements.
Most scholars
use
of
the
interest
test,althoughtheydisapproved
compelling
agreedabout desirableoutcomesit shouldyieldand about the apof the Court's techniquesforevadingthe test.
propriateness
The Lemontestforestablishment
cases was sharplychallenged
fromwithinand withoutthe Court.Each of the threestrandswas
criticizedas vague, ambiguous,and inappropriate.From time to
time,the testdid not seem crucial,and in one instancethe Court
explicitlydisregardedit.3Major challengesstatedthat:(1) courts
should not judge motivesof legislators;(2) determining
primary
effectsis too difficult;
(3) a testcondemningpromotionof religion
does not recognizepermissibleaccommodationsto religiousexercise; (4) levels of supervisiondesignedto avoid impropereffects
should not be treatedas unacceptableentanglements;
(5) the bar
on undueentanglement
has sometimesmistakenly
includeda separatefocuson politicaldivisiveness.
JusticeO'Connor proposedan
of the firsttwo elements
"endorsementtest" as an interpretation
1Lemonv Kurtzman,403 US 602 (1971).
Larsonv Valente,
456 US 228 (1982). The compellinginteresttestwas not said to apply
when the formof religiousclassification
was to achieve an acceptableaccommodationto
the religiousneeds of a group or groups.
463 US 783 (1983).
3 Marsh v Chambers,
2
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of Lemon.Under this test, adopted by the Court in one case,4
judges inquirewhethera reasonablepersonwould take the challengedstateactionas endorsinga religion.Some Justicesindicated
standardis whethera law
thatthe core of a correctestablishment
or practicewould have a coerciveeffecton nonadherents.Some
Justicesproposedthatthe centralquestionlies in how a challenged
practicecompareswithpracticesacceptedor rejectedby the constitutionalfounders.
and suppleThe variouscriticisms,
alternatives,
interpretations,
standards
for
the
and
Lemon
testsbear
interest
mentary
compelling
on presentprospectsforadjudicationunderbothRelisignificantly
Clauses.
To understandhow this is so, we need initiallyto
gion
have changedin the last fewyears.
see how circumstances
The Court startledreligiousclause scholarsin 1990 whena majorityof five declared that the compellinginteresttest did not
applyto mostfreeexercisecases.5With the leadershipof some of
thesescholarsand theforceful
supportofmajorreligiousorganizations,Congressadopted a law thathas reinstatedthe compelling
interesttestforfederaland statecases.6The effectof thatstatute
on the constitutionalcase law generatesthe main uncertainties
about freeexerciselaw.
The shiftin establishmentlaw has been more attenuated.In
school1992,JusticeKennedywrotea majorityopinionforbidding
at
school
It fosponsoredprayers public
graduationceremonies.7
cused on coercion,but did not explicitlydisavowthe Lemontest
and was joined byJusticeswho supportedthattest.A year later,
JusticeWhite,a steadyopponentof resultsunderLemon,wrotea
majority opinion employingits standards.8AnsweringJustice
Scalia's ridiculeof use of a testthata majorityno longersupports,
JusticeWhite commentedthatLemonhad not been overruledand
that this case "presentsno occasion to do so."9 In 1994 Justice
O'Connor wrotethatthe Court shouldabandonthe effortto forCountyv ACLU, 492 US 573 (1989).
4Allegheny
s Employment
DivisionOregonDept. ofHuman Resources
v Smith,494 US 872 (1990).
6 Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 107 Stat 1488 (codifiedprincipally
at 42 USC
2000bb (Supp V 1993)).

Lee v Weisman,
505 US 577 (1992).

8Lamb's Chapelv CenterMorichesSchoolDist., 113 S Ct 2141 (1993).

9 Id

at 2148, n 7.
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Clause litigation,
mulatea unifiedtestforEstablishment
recogniza
kind
that
test
for
one
of
ing
appropriate
problemmay not be
for
this
four
otherJusticesnow
point,
appropriate another."1By
and
on the Court, Rehnquist,Kennedy,Scalia,
Thomas, had expressedtheirdistasteforLemon.
Two cases at the end of the 1994 termrang the deathknellof
theLemontestas an integrated
whole.In themoresignificant
deciv Rectorand Visitors
sion,Rosenberger
oftheUniversity
of Virginia,"
the Court held thatif a stateuniversity
authorizespaymentsfrom
its StudentActivitiesFund to printersthatpublishmaterialsof a
broadrangeofstudentgroups,it cannotdeclineto payforpublicato a Christianlife.The
tionof a magazinethaturgescommitment
the
issues
was
The organizersof the
of
constitutional
this.
posture
Awake
the
Wide
that
refusalof
complained
university's
magazine
fundingviolatedthefreespeechprinciplethatthe stateshouldnot
discriminateamong speech on the basis of content.The univerforits
sityinterposedthe EstablishmentClause as a justification
content-basedguidelines,underwhichfundswere unavailablefor
one which"primarily
a religiousactivity,
promotesor manifestsa
The
in
a
an
or
or
ultimatereality.""12
about
deity
particularbelie[f]
5-4
the
claimant's
free
a
vote,accepted
Court,by
speechargument
offeredby the university.
and rejectedthe justification
One importantaspectof the decisionis the absenceof reference
to Lemon.JusticeKennedy'smajorityopinionstressesthatfunding
of WideAwakewill allow religiousadvocacyto be treatedequally
withothersubjectsof studentconcern.He emphasizesthatno settled principlebarringgovernmentfundingof religionprecludes
thepayments.The opiniondiscussessome cases decidedunderthe
"effects"strandof Lemon,but nowherementionsthe Lemonforeffects.Indicatingthatthe Court's
mulationabout impermissible
no
which
review
of material,will involveless
requires
approach,
officialentanglementwith religion than if the guidelineswere
a preused, JusticeKennedy cites Walz v Tax Commissioner,"3
Lemondecisionsustainingtax exemptionsforchurches.
"oBoardofEducationof KiryasJoel VillageSchoolDist. v Grumet,114 S Ct 2481, 2499
(1994).
" 115 S Ct 2510 (1995).
12
Id at 2515.
13 397 US 664 (1970), cited at 115 S Ct 2524. The cite is not offered
directlybut in a
454 US 263 (1981).
quote fromWidmarv Vincent,
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JusticeO'Connor, whosevotewas crucialto makeup a majority,
wrote separatelyabout the need to resolvein contexta clash of
the neutrality
principleand the no fundingprinciple.14She treats
endorsesthe
safeguardsagainstany perceptionthatthe university
she
as
but
does not
magazine's religiousperspective significant,
an
as
test.
she
"endorsement"
repeats
present
overarching Instead,
her observationthat "experienceproves that the Establishment
Clause . . . cannoteasilybe reducedto a singletest.""s
JusticeSouter's opinion forthe fourdissentersemphasizesthe
of "directfundingof core religiousactivitiesby an
unacceptability
arm of the State."'6At one point,he indicatesthata crucialissue
is whether"the law is trulyneutralwithrespectto religion(thatis,
whetherthe law either'advance[s][or]inhibit[s]religion',.... )";17
buthe does not offertheLemontestas thecorrectwayto approach
the establishment
question,stickinginsteadto the narrowpreclusion of public funding.In sum,not a singleJusticein Rosenberger
relies on Lemon as a comprehensivestandardfor determining
whetherfundingviolatesthe EstablishmentClause.
The otherdecision,CapitolSquare Reviewand Advisory
Boardv
a
involved
similar
of
free
and
establishPinette,8"
joinder
speech
ment claims. The Ku Klux Klan claimed a freespeech rightto
place a crosson government
propertythatwas open to otherfreeof
structures
privategroups;the governmentagencyrestanding
for
Clause
sponsible issuingpermitsurgedthatthe Establishment
barreddisplayof a religioussymbol.Again,no Justiceused the
Lemontestas the standardof inquiry.The majoritywas composed
ofJusticesadoptingtwo different
theories.JusticeScalia,joined in
this part of his opinion by ChiefJusticeRehnquist,JusticeKennedy, and JusticeThomas, maintainedthat so long as the governmentevenhandedlyallows privatespeech on public property,
9 Justice
possible perceptions of endorsementare irrelevant.
Souter
and
O'Connor, joined byJustices
Breyer,disagreed.20
They
115 S Ct at 2525-28.
15Id at 2528 (quotingKiryasJoel,114 S Ct 2481, 2499).
16Id at 2533.
Countyv ACLU, 492 US 573, 592).
"7Id at 2541 (quotingAllegheny
18115 S Ct 2440 (1995).
ofa "transferred
endorsement"principle.
19Id at 2447-50. JusticeScalia writesslightingly
20 Id at 2451-57.
14
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assertedthatif a reasonable,informedobserverwould perceivea
governmentendorsementhere,the displaywould be impermissible. But theyconcludedthat,because such an observerwould not
perceiveendorsementhere,the displaydid not violatethe Estabof the view
lishmentClause. Significantly,
O'Connor's reiteration
thatno singletestsufficesforestablishment
issueswas embraced
by Souterand Breyer.21
JusticesStevensand Ginsburgdissented.JusticeStevens,who
has consistently
favoreda strongseparationof churchand state,
a
version
of an endorsementtest,but one thatleads to a
adopted
of
state
endorsement
much more easilythan O'Connor's
finding
JusticeGinsburg'sshortdissentalso makes endorseapproach.22
ment central.23Because she neitherjoined JusticeStevens nor
about endorsement,
one
adoptedJusticeO'Connor's formulation
guessesthatshe has notyetresolvedwhatversionof thatapproach
formulations
results.Pito use when different
mayyielddifferent
netteshows thatforsomeissuesa majorityof the Justicesbelieve
is thecrucialinquiry;butthatmajorityis divided
thatendorsement
over how the testshould be cast. Seven membersof the present
Court have now dissociatedthemselvesfromthe Lemontest.No
or Capitol
one defendsLemon as a whole in eitherRosenberger
the
Lemon
test
to
be
has
decisivelyrejected
Square.Although
yet
in a opinionof the Court,no Justiceis likelyto come forwardand
tryto reviveit.
Beforediscussingthepresentstatusof ReligionClause adjudication and its futureprospectsin more detail,I offera few brief
tests.By a "constitutional
observations
aboutconstitutional
test,"I
mean a standardof adjudicationthatis used bycourtsto determine
The stanor unconstitutional.
whethera practiceis constitutional
dard mustbe more than an enumerationof negativeand positive
factors;if the standardis satisfied,the outcomemustbe different
fromwhatit would be if the standardwere unsatisfied.
Although
tests occasionallyare merelyconscious smokescreensor unconfordecisionsreachedon otherbases, tests
scious rationalizations
and the domioftenrevealwhatjudges regardas determinative;
Id at 2454.
Id at 2464-73.
23 Id at 2474-75.
21

22
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nanceofa testmaylead judgesto a resulttheywouldnot otherwise
reach.24
Identifying
genuineadherenceto a testis not alwayssimple.SupremeCourtJusticesoftenjoin opinions,especiallymajorityopinions, that employbasic standardstheydo not believe should be
dominant.A Justicemayconcludethatfailureunderthe opinion's
standardcondemnsa practice,even thoughtheJusticewould preferto concentrateon otherelements.25
Or theJusticeis willingto
use a prevailingtesthe or she would abandonwhenenoughother
Justicesare readyto change direction.26
testsmaybe based on "wrongness"
Challengesto constitutional
or "indecisiveness."On thefirstscore,a criticarguesthatadhering
to all or partof a testproduceslegal resultsthatare wrong,that
the testfocuseson the wrongfactors(or on the rightfactorsbut
in the wrongorderor proportion).Under the headingof indecisiveness,a testmaybe attackedas too vague or ambiguousin its
content,or as havingtermsthatare too openendedto give adequate guidance.27
Is there any alternativeto using a "constitutionaltest"? As I
have here definedtests,a court may do withoutone, measuring
relevantfactorsagainstbasic constitutional
valuesbut not offering
any linguisticformulaforits resolution.
II.

FREE EXERCISE

AND THE COMPELLING

INTEREST

TEST

The fateof freeexerciseclaimsand testsdependson how
a majorityof the Court relatestheirprinciplesof constitutional
24
This is most obviouslytrue for judges in the hierarchybeneaththe court that has
establishedthetest,butit also appliesto SupremeCourtJusticesand judgeson othercourts
thathave adopted particulartests.
25
Thus, theJusticeswho were willingto adoptJusticeKennedy's"coercion approach"
to prayersat public school graduationdid thinkthat the indirectcoercion renderedthe
even thoughconcurringopinions show theywould have found
prayersunconstitutional,
otherelementsmoresimplydispositive.They joined the Kennedyopinionin partbecause
theywantedto have an opinionoftheCourt,and JusticeKennedywas disinclinedto accept
theirtheories.
26For thesereasons,genuineallegianceto a testis shownmostdecisivelywhena Justice
saysthat he or she adopts the test in a concurringor dissentingopinion. The adoption
needs to be somethingmore than: "Employingthe Court's own approachto the case, its
resultis mistaken."
27However,some indecisivenessmay be defendedas a positivevirtue.WhereasJustice
Scalia is largelydrivenby a quest forstandardsthateliminatejudicial discretion,Justice
O'Connor has suggestedthat delicatejudgmentsamong conflicting
principlesin context
are partof the heartof constitutional
adjudication.See note 14. See also FrankI. Michel-
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adjudicationto an act of Congressthatdictatesa standardof decision forstateand federalcases.Will the Courtnow employa compellinginteresttestforfreeexerciseclaimsand, if so, how will it
applythattest?
A. BEFORE EMPLOYMENT

DIVISION

V SMITH

The Court firstannounceda compellinginteresttest for free
exerciseclaimsin Sherbert
v Verner,28
holdingthata statemaynot
refuseunemployment
benefitsto someonewhose unwillingness
to
work on Saturdayis motivatedby religiousconvictions.Justice
Brennanwrote that the state's law denyingcompensationcould
be applied only if "any incidentalburdenon the freeexerciseof
appellant'sreligionmaybe justifiedby a compellingstateinterest
in the regulationof a subject withinthe State's constitutional
power to regulate . ..."29 The Court foundno solid supportfor
a worrythatspuriousclaimsmightdilutetheunemployment
fund;
even if that possibilityexisted,"it would plainlybe incumbent
thatno alternative
formsofregupon theappelleesto demonstrate
ulationwouldcombatsuchabuseswithoutinfringing
FirstAmendmentrights."30
The legal effectof this powerfullanguage cannot be assessed
solelyby subsequentSupremeCourt cases. Othercourtssustained
a varietyof freeexerciseclaims,and legislatorsgrantedstatutory
exemptionsthey believed might be constitutionally
required.
Nonetheless,apart fromvariationson the Sherbert
problem,the
Court upheld freeexerciseargumentsonly when the Amish asserteda constitutional
rightto withdrawtheirchildrenfromordinaryschool afterthe eighthgrade,3"and when a Native American
refusedto use a socialsecuritynumberto receivewelfarebenefits.32
100 Harv L Rev
man,The SupremeCourt,1985 Term-Foreword:TracesofSelfGovernment,
4, 33-36 (1986); KathleenM. Sullivan,TheSupremeCourt,1991 Term-Foreword:TheJusticesofRulesand Standards,106 Harv L Rev 22 (1992).
28 374 US 398 (1963).
29
Id at 403 (quotingNAACP v Button,371 US 415, 438 (1963)).
30Id at 407.
v Yoder,406 US 205 (1972).
31Wisconsin
32Bowenv Roy,476 US 693 (1986). See StephenPepper, TakingtheFreeExerciseClause
1986 BYU L Rev 299, 319-22. In Jensenv Quaring,472 US 478 (1985) (per
Seriously,
an EighthCircuitdecisionthatthe statecould
curiam),an equallydividedCourt affirmed
not insistthatMrs. Quaring have a driver'slicensewitha photo. Quaringv Peterson,
728
F2d 1121 (8th Cir 1984). (Such affirmances
have no precedentialweight.)

8]
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The Court employedthreestrategiesthatexplainwhythe compellinginteresttestfailedto yieldmore victoriesforfreeexercise
claims:(1) weak application,(2) evasion,and (3) thresholddenial.
interests
the Court acceptedgovernment
Most straightforwardly,
look
and
did
not
of moderatestrengthas sufficiently
compelling
The 1982 case of UnitedStates
too hard at availablealternatives.33
v Lee34reflectsthisapproach.An AmishemployerwithAmishemployeesclaimeda rightnot to pay theirsocial securitytaxes.The
Court understoodthatthe Amishaccept a religiousresponsibility
to providefortheirown elderlyand needywithinthe community
in the nationalsocial
and are religiouslyopposed to participation
Amishand
securitysystem.Congress has allowed self-employed
membersof othersimilarreligiousgroupsan exemptionfromsocial securitytaxes,butthe exemptioncoversneitheremployersnor
is indisemployees.The Court said thatmandatoryparticipation
to
of
the
social
and
the
fiscal
pensable
vitality
securitysystem, that
. . . systo accommodatethe comprehensive
"it would be difficult
tem withmyriadexceptionsflowingfroma wide varietyof reliThe Court urged thatsocial securitytaxescould
gious beliefs."35
not be distinguished
fromgeneraltaxesand thatpeople shouldnot
be able to avoid income taxeson religiousgrounds.
The Court is less than convincing.Social securitytaxesrepresent a kind of forcedsavings.Amishemployeesasserttheydraw
fromthe fundkeptforthose who have paid social securitytaxes,
and historicalexperiencebearsthemout. If employersdid not pay
social securitytaxeswhenboththeyand theiremployeeshave religious objectionsand such employeesrarelydrawon publicmoney,
that resultwould not thwartany compellingintereststhe Court
discusses.On the otherhand,the Court mighthave worriedthat
any exemptionwould encourageAmishemployersto discriminate
in hiring,and thatsome Amishemployeeswill leave the faithand
seek public funds.Lee's resultis defensible,but the Court's comand itstreatment
is casual.36
pellinginteresttestis hardlystringent
33Douglas Laycock,however,arguesthatthe Courtdid not "waterdown" thecompelling
and theRatchet,56
interesttest in cases in which it applied it. Laycock,RFRA, Congress,
Mont L Rev 145, 149 (1995).
34455 US 252 (1982).
35 Id at 259-60.
36See JesseChoper,The Riseand DeclineoftheConstitutional
Protection
ofReligious
Liberty,
70 U Neb L Rev 651, 663-65 (1991).

332

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[1995

Goldmanv Weinberger37
was the most notable exampleof evasion,thatis, not applyingthetestforkindsofsituationsitsgeneral
termswould cover. The Air Force, with other branchesof the
armedforces,had a rule barringthewearingof headgearindoors.
Dr. Goldman,a clinicalpsychologist,
OrthodoxJew,and ordained
rabbi,was orderedto stopwearinghisyarmulkeinsidethehospital
wherehe worked.For Goldman,wearingof the yarmulkewas a
sincerereliformof religiousobservance.He had an indisputably
gious objectionto applicationof the generalrule. Three concuragainstmemringJusticesworriedabout possible discrimination
bersof otherreligionswho mightwear less familiarheadgear;but
JusticeRehnquist'sopinion for the Court emphasizedthat "our
review of militaryregulationschallengedon First Amendment
reviewof simithanconstitutional
groundsis farmore deferential
He noted
lar laws or regulationsdesignedfor civiliansociety.""38
that "[t]he consideredprofessionaljudgmentof the Air Force is
of personnelin standardizedunithat the traditionaloutfitting
formsencouragesthe subordinationof personalpreferencesand
and he concluded
identitiesin favoroftheoverallgroupmission"39
mandateto abandon
thatthe militaryis "underno constitutional
theirconsideredprofessionaljudgment"behind regulationsthat
"reasonablyand evenhandedlyregulate dress..
."40 One can
imaginea courtapplyinga compellinginteresttestwithsubstantial
deferenceto the militaryaboutthe importanceof an objectiveand
but the Rehnquistopiniongoes
the means of its accomplishment,
well beyondthat.It surrendersany seriousexaminationof either
theoverallneed fortheruleor oftheriskofexceptions.The Court
adopted the same approachfor generallyapplicablerules within
prisons.41
The Court's thirdstrategyfornot applyingthe compellinginteresttesthas been thresholddenial,based on a claimant'sfailure
to establishsome requisiteneeded to bringthe testinto play.The
Indian
most significant
case of this genre was Lyngv Northwest
475 US 503 (1986).
38Id at 507.
39Id at 508.
4oId at 509-10.
41See O'Lone v EstateofShabazz,482 US 342 (1987).
37
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Protective
The federalgovernment
Association.42
proposedto
Cemetery
in
a
and
timber
manner
that
federal
land,
permit
harvesting,
develop
with
and
undisturbed
natural
the
interfered
privacy,silence,
setting
thatsome groupsof Indiansregardedas essentialforworshipat sacred sites.JusticeO'Connor's opinionforthe Court did not doubt
thatthe loggingand road buildingprojects"could have devastating
on traditional
Indianreligiouspractices."43
effects
she
Nevertheless,
of its own landwas not the
said thatthe government's
development
kindof activity
thatcould "prohibit,"
evenindirectly,
anyone'sexercise ofreligion.BecausetheFirstAmendment
forbidsCongressfrom
the freeexerciseof religion,it does not restrict
such
"prohibiting"
In additionto thisconceptualargumentthatthe
land development.
Indianshad not showna relevant
burden,the Court expressedconcernthatthe oppositeapproachwouldopen courtsup to all sortsof
decisionsdealingwithgovernreligiouschallengesto government
mentproperty,
assessment
of how centralvariousfeatures
requiring
of religiouspracticeare to thoseobjectingto thegovernment
activiIn
Brennan
that
claimants
needed
ties.44 dissent,Justice
responded
raiseda "substantial
and realonlyto showthatthelanddevelopment
isticthreat"to "central"aspectsof theirreligion.45
He strongly
obview
to
the
Court's
that
coercion
differs
for
free
jected
qualitatively
exercisepurposesfrominterferences
withreligiouspracticethatland
can cause.The NativeAmericanplaintiffs
did need to
development
makea showingof centrality
beforethe government
a
had to satisfy
interest
but
"would
be
the
arbiters
of
which
test,
compelling
they
practicesare centralto theirfaith,subjectonlyto thenormalrequirementthattheirclaimsbe genuineand sincere."46
B. EMPLOYMENT

DIVISION

V SMITH

In Employment
Divisionv Smith,47
JusticeScalia wrotetheCourt's
opinionforhimselfand fourotherJustices.The heartof the case,
42
485 US 439 (1988). See also Bowenv Roy,476 US 693 (1986), holdingthatthe government'sown internaluse of social securitynumberswas not subjectto a freeexerciseclaim.
See generallyIra C. Lupu, WhereRightsBegin:The ProblemofBurdenson theFree Exercise
ofReligion,102 Harv L Rev 933 (1989).
43 485 US at 451.
4 Id at 457-58.
45Id at 475.
46Id.
47

494 US 872 (1990).
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as the Court consideredit, was whethermembersof the Native
AmericanChurchhad a rightto ingestpeyotein worshipservices
despitea stateprohibitionof the use of peyote.Some statecourts
had earliernotedthatpeyoteformedthe centerof worshipof the
NativeAmericanChurchand had decidedthatstateslackeda compellinginterestin barringthisworship.48In Smith,the Court held
thatreligiousclaimantshave no specialprivilegesin respectto laws
of general application.If a reasonable law is neitherdirected
against a religious practice nor discriminatesamong religious
groups,it maybe validlyappliedagainstpeople withreligiousobjections.The stateneed not satisfyanytestbeyondthe easy task
of showingthatthe law is otherwisevalid.
no real change
JusticeScalia wroteas ifthe decisionrepresented
in the Court'sapproachto freeexercisecases.To renderthatposiv Yoder,in
tion remotelyplausible,he had to explain Wisconsin
whichtheAmishclaimto violatea validschool attendancelaw had
been upheld.AccordingtoJusticeScalia,thecriticalfeatureofthat
witha pacase was thatthe freeexerciseclaimhad been combined
rentalclaim to decide upon the educationof children.
Smith sharplyreduced the significanceof the Free Exercise
Clause. The Clause protected"the rightto believe and profess
but the Free Speech
whateverreligiousdoctrineone desires,"49
The Clause
Clause would safeguardthese rightsin any event.50
if
acts
abstentions
the
other
and
protected
"soughtto
government
ban ... [them]onlywhentheyare engagedin forreligiousreasons,
or onlybecause of the religiousbeliefthattheydisplay."51
Finally,
the Clause mightprovidesome undetermined
protectionwhenreligiousobjectorsalso claimedparentalrights,associationalrights,
free speech rights,or other constitutionalrights.Althoughthe
Court said "it is easy to envisiona case in whicha challengeon
61 Cal 2d 716, 394 P2d 813, 40 Cal Rptr69 (1964).
48See, e.g., Peoplev Woody,
49494 US at 877.
SO It is
thattheprotectionofreligiousviewswouldbe greaterin peripheralcontexts
possible
than the protectionof manyotherviews themselvescoveredby the Free Speech Clause.
Thus, the statemightbe barredfromconsideringsomeone'sreligiousopinionsand associadecisionsor in awardsof child custody,thoughit could contionsin its own employment
siderotheropinionsand associations(such as virulentracistconvictionsor membershipin
in Constituthe Ku Klux Klan). I touchedon thisissue in Greenawalt,Religionas a Concept
tionalLaw, 72 Cal L Rev 753, 777 (1984), and am presentlyworkingon an articleon
religiousand nonreligiousassociationsthatconsidersit.
'1494 US at 877.
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freedomof associationgroundswould likewisebe reinforcedby
Free ExerciseClaims concerns,""52
it did not botherto explainwhy
claims about worshipserviceswere not relevantlyabout association. Smith,it said, did not present"a hybridsituation... .""
Assessingtherelevanceofthe "combination"or "hybrid"analysis in Smithis hard. Most scholarsassume this language was a
make-weightto "explain" Yoderthatlacks enduringsignificance.
In many cases, of course,free exerciseclaims have trackedfree
speechclaims,but the freeexerciseclaimswere probablynot necessary.JusticeScalia's implicitclaim-that freeexerciseclaimsare
a necessary
componentof some successful"hybrid"challengesbut
that claims of the same type can neversucceed on theirownWe may
approaches,and possiblyachieves,incomprehensibility.
doubtthatin futurecases freeexerciseclaimswill be requiredfor
a result, though they could not conceivablybe sufficientby
themselves.54
In responseto a subsequentchallengeto a ban on killinganimals
forsacrifice,the Court held thatthe law was aimed specifically
at
Once havingclassireligiouspracticesand was unconstitutional."
fiedthe law, the Court engagedin a compellinginterestanalysis,
whichit treatedas genuinelystrictscrutiny.
For lawsaimedat relior
we can
giouspractice discriminating
explicitly
amongreligions,56
continueto expecta verystringentapplicationof the compelling
interesttest.
C. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT

Aftersubstantiallobbyingby major religiousorganizations,a
unanimousHouse of Representatives,
by voice vote,and a nearly
unanimousSenate57adopted the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act in 1993.58The main operativepartof the Act,Section 3, pro52

Id at 882.

53Id.

v BoardofTrustees
54See Kissinger
oftheOhioStat Univ.,5 F3d 177, 180 (6th Cir 1993).
For briefaccountsof some othercases discussing"hybrid"claims,see Choper (cited in
note 36) at 681.
55ChurchofLukumiBabaluAyev CityofHialeah, 113 S Ct 2217 (1993).
56But see note 2 in respectto acceptableaccommodations.
theReligious
FreedomRestora57See Douglas Laycockand Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting
tionAct,73 Tex L Rev 209, 210-11 (1994).
58 See note 6.
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burdena person's
vides that"Governmentshall not substantially

from
results
a ruleofgeneral
exercise
ofreligion
eveniftheburden
bur"Government
that
maysubstantially
applicability
.... except
. . . ifit demonstrates
exercise
ofreligion
thatapplidena person's
totheperson
ofa comcationoftheburden
(1) is infurtherance

means
and(2) is theleastrestrictive
interest;
pellinggovernmental

interest."
"Governthatcompelling
of furthering
governmental
ment"specifically
includes
stateandlocal,as wellas federal,
govto mean"theexerThe "exerciseofreligion"is defined
ernment.

.. ." Another
section
undertheFirstAmendment.
ciseofreligion
in thisActshallbe
that"Nothing
oftheact,Section7, provides
to affect,
or in anywayaddress"theEstablishconstrued
interpret

benefits
mentClause, and, further,
thatanygrantsof government

totheextent
undertheEstablishment
andexemptions
permissible
findoftheact.Among
thepreliminary
Clausearenota violation
toward
mayburden
religion
ingsintheactare"thatlaws'neutral'

withrelireligiousexerciseas surelyas laws intendedto interfere
v
Smith
Division
that
exercise,"
"virtuallyelimiEmployment
gious
burdenson relithatthegovernment
natedtherequirement
justify
gious exerciseimposedby laws neutraltowardreligion,"and that
"the compellinginteresttest as set forthin priorFederal court
rulingsis a workabletest for strikingsensiblebalances between
religious libertyand competingprior governmentalinterests."
Amongthepurposesof the act is "to restorethecompellinginterest testas set forthin" Sherbert
and Yoder.
To understandwhattestthe SupremeCourt will applyin most
freeexercisecases, one must gauge how its memberswill relate
decisions.I suggestcatethestatuteto thecorpusof constitutional
invalidthese
relations
into
four
possibilities:(1) statutory
gorizing
ity;(2) grudgingapplication;(3) moderatelyprotectivestandards,
like those thatexistedin some yearspriorto Smith;(4) stronger
protectionof freeexerciseclaimsthan has been givenbefore.
If we ask, "How manyJusticeswill have to accept the act in
the answeris notfive.Emorderforit to be practically
effective?"
constitutional
v
Smith
a
Division
is
not
well-established
yet
ployment
as
of
as
close
and
the
division
was
possibleon
Justices
precedent,
altered
its centraldoctrinalpoint.That doctrine,whichdrastically
has
been
constitutional
rejectedby
overwhelmingly
jurisprudence,
Congress.Justiceswho believethatSmithwas mistakenor thatits
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hostilereceptionjustifiesabandoningit59willfeelfreenot to follow
standard.At leasttwoJusticesdo apparently
its constitutional
think
the rule of Smithis mistaken,60and someversionof the compelling
interesttestis the obvious alternativeto applyin its place.
OtherJustices,who accept Smithas authoritative
constitutional
also
the
Freedom
Restoration
Act
doctrine,may
accept
Religious
as a valid statute,which alters the standardcourts should employ. A religious claimant can succeed in overturningSmith's
standardof reviewby attaininga combinationof fiveJusticeswho
treatthe act as valid or supportoverrulingSmithon constitutional
grounds.61
1. Possibleinvalidity.
Is the Religious Freedom RestorationAct
valid? It may be invalidas a whole,as it reachesstatecases, or in
specificapplications.It may be invalidbecause it infringesupon
individualrights,because it offendsseparationof powers,or because Congresslacks enumeratedauthorityto enact it.
a) Individualrights.In purportingto vindicate free exercise
of religion,62
claims,the statutemightconstitutean establishment
violate the freeexerciserightsof others,or infringetheirrights
a Justicemayreasonablytake Congress'sview as influential
5 As I discusssubsequently,
about the desirableconstitutional
standard,independentof Congress'sactual authorityto
dictatea different
standard.See Daniel Conkle, The ReligiousFreedomRestoration
Act: The
Constitutional
Statute,56 Mont L Rev 39, 79-90 (1995).
ofan Unconstitutional
Significance
60 See Church
oftheLukumiBabaluAyev CityofHialeah,113 S Ct at 2250 (JusticeO'Connor joiningJusticeBlackmunin sayingSmithwas wronglydecided), at 2243-50 (Justice
Souterexpressing
strongdoubtsaboutSmith).JusticeThomas joined themajorityin Church
oftheLukumiBabaluAye,but has not had occasion to pass on the basic doctrinalapproach
of Smith.JusticesGinsbergand Breyerhave yetto decide a freeexercisecase as members
of the SupremeCourt.
6' Two further
pointsfollow.The versionof the compellinginteresttestto be employed
could be affectedby whethera majorityof fivesustainthe statuteor is composedof some
test.The second point
Justicesrelyingon the statuteand some on a directconstitutional
concernsa differencebetweenthe way the Supreme Court treatscases challengingthe
statuteand thewayothercourtsdo. Thosecourts
do (and should)regardthemselvesas bound
to followSmithas the appropriateconstitutional
standard.Thus, onlyifa majorityofjudges
(or a singlejudge,sittingalone) acceptsthestatuteas validwill a courtapplythecompelling
interesttest as a part of federallaw. State courtsmay,I should add, interprettheirown
stateconstitutions
as demandinga stricter
standardofreviewthantheone adoptedin Smith,
and a numberof themhave done so. See AngelaC. Carmella,StateConstitutional
Protection
1993 BYU L Rev 275; Tracey
ofReligiousExercise:An EmergingPost-Smith
Jurisprudence,
theFreeExerciseClausesofTheirOwnConstiLevy,Rediscovering
Rights:StateCourtsReconsider
in the WakeofEmployment
tutions
Divisionv Smith,67 Temple L Rev 1017 (1994).
Clause rightsas a speciesof individualrights,althoughtheconsti62I1treatEstablishment
tutionalwrongof establishment
need not be done to specificindividuals.
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to equal treatment
as a matterof freespeech or equal protection
law. Anydifficulties
in theseregardsconcernbothfederaland state
applications.63
As firstglance,the EstablishmentClause problemmightseem
troublesome.The statutedictatessubstantialaccommodationto
In Estate
religiousexerciseacross a wide range of circumstances.
Thornton
v
that
a
state's
Caldor,Inc.,64
of
eightJusticesagreed
rigid
statutorydemand that employersaccommodatesabbath observancesof employeeswas impermissible.
If a statuteoftendemands
accommodationsto religionthat constituteforbiddenestablishments,it will violatethe EstablishmentClause.
The concernabout generalinvalidity
turnsout to be unthreatOn
individual
have suggestedthatconoccasion,
Justices
ening.65
stitutionaldecisionsrequiringsubstantialaccommodationsto free
exerciseraise establishment
worries,but typicallythese opinions
haveincludedcommentsthatlegislatures
mayaccommodateifthey
choose to do so. JusticeScalia in Employment
Divisionv Smithexthat
could
choose to
plicitlysuggested
constitutionally
legislatures
afforda religiousexemptionfromlaws againstusingpeyote.66
The
implicationis thatmanyaccommodationsare acceptableunderthe
Establishment
Clause. No Justicehas everproposedthatemploymentof the compellinginteresttestas a generalstandardforfree
exercisecases itselfviolatesthe EstablishmentClause.67Barringa
huge shiftin the law of the ReligionClauses,onlysomeaccommodationsthatthe main sectionof the statutemightrequirewould
violatethe EstablishmentClause.
The statutecontainstwo internaldevicesto preventanyapplicationsfromviolatingthe EstablishmentClause. One is the specific
63Accordingto prevailing"incorporation"doctrine,the FirstAmendmentapplies with
the same forceto stateand federalgovernments,
and the thrustof the Court's decisions
is thatin most respectsthe Due Process Clause of the FifthAmendmentimposeson the
federalgovernmentthe restrictions
of the Equal ProtectionClause.
64 472 US 703 (1985).
65 one advocateda radicalalterationin the
of the Free Exercise
If
perceivedrelationship
and EstablishmentClauses, one mightargue forgeneralinvalidity
on thisbasis. See note
68.
66
494 US at 890.
67JusticeStevenshas expressedconcernthatevaluationof themeritsof variousreligious
claimsis a riskthe EstablishmentClause was meantto preclude.UnitedStatesv Lee, 455
US 252, 263 n 2 (1982) (concurringopinion).See also Goldmanv Weinberger,
475 US 503,
512 (1986) (concurringopinion).
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interprovisionthatnothingin theactwillbe "construedto affect,
in
or
address"
I
the
take
Establishment
Clause.
this
pret,
anyway
to
mean
this:
"Do
not
refer
to
to
this
statute
provision
roughly
decide howthe EstablishmentClause should be interpreted,
and
do not applythe statuteto violatetheEstablishment
Clause." Suppose the main provisionwould apply to a claim,were it not for
the EstablishmentClause. One mightsay thatthe statuteapplies,
but the EstablishmentClause makes the applicationinvalid.A
preferableconceptualization,however,given the statutorylanguage, is thatthe statutedoes not applybecause of the safeguard
provision.
The statute'scompellinginteresttestitselfyieldsthe same effect.Suppose thata claimantseeks an accommodationthatwould
violate the EstablishmentClause. A statehas a compelling
interest
in avoidingthisunconstitutional
situation.68
What I have said thusfaraboutthe Establishment
Clause shows
free
free
and
exercise,
whypossible
speech,
equal protectionobjectionsare similarly
ill-grounded.If grantingthe freeexerciseclaims
of one personwould violate the freeexerciserightsof someone
else,thatactionwould also violatethe Establishment
Clause, since
of
the
first
at
the
of
the
second
would
favoring
religion
expense
be a formof establishment.
What of the possibility
thatsome statutoryapplicationsmightviolate a principleof neutrality
required
the
of
rest
the
First
or
Amendment
the
Protection
by
Equal
Clause? The Court mightaffordan exemptionunder the statute
forreligiousclaimantsand announcethatconstitutional
principle
requiresan extensionto nonreligiousclaimants.69
Suppose,instead,
68This does not quitedisposeofconcernthatapplicationswouldviolatetheEstablishment
Clause. Suppose thatthevastmajorityof accommodationsapparentlyrequiredby the act's
mainprovisionare barredbytheEstablishment
Clause. In otherwords,onlya smallproportion of apparentlyrequiredaccommodationswould be constitutionally
permissible.One
actionand
scheme,its effecton government
mightthenconcludethatthe whole statutory
the litigationit spawns,would violatethe Establishment
Clause. It could violatethe EstablishmentClause to forcegovernments
in manycases to demonstratethat theyneed not
make accommodationsbecause of that clause. This theoryfounderson the realitythat,
view(whichI thinkis correct),mostaccommodations
accordingto the heavilypreponderant
the statutewould otherwiserequirewould not violatethe Establishment
Clause. It is relevantin thisregardthatthestatutedoes not requiregovernments
to forceprivateenterprises
to make accommodations,
one kindof situationthathas led the Court to interposeEstablishmentClause objections.
69This is the positionJusticeHarlan took in Welshv UnitedStates,398 US 333, 35758 (1970) (concurringopinion),about the claim of a nonreligiousconscientiousobjector
to receivean exemptionfrommilitary
servicethatCongresshad givento religiousobjectors.
In determiningwhetherCongress would want the exemptionextendedto nonreligious
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the Court concludesthatthe inequalityshould not be redressed
in thisway but thatlimitingan exemptionto religiousclaimants
would violatethe Free Speech or the Equal ProtectionClause. In
has a compellinginterestin not grantthatevent,the government
ing the exemption.
Clause conLet us now considertwomoresubtleEstablishment
of
which
into
of
the
second
shades
a
cerns,
problem separationof
is
a
powers.The firstconcern that generalstatutethatprovides
exemptionsforreligiousclaimantsrepresentsa Congressionalendorsementof religion.70A centralthemeof recentEstablishment
Clause jurisprudenceis that governmentshould endorseneither
particularreligionsnor religionin general. Because the statute
speaksof religiousclaimsin general,perhapsit endorsesreligion
as opposed to nonreligiousoutlooks.
The shortresponseto thisconcernis thatwhenstateand federal
courts have used the compellinginteresttest for free exercise
claims,and when legislatureshave adopted narrowaccommodathesehave not been regarded
tionsgrantingreligiousexemptions,
endorsements.A broader Congressionalacas unconstitutional
commodationthatemploysthe compellinginteresttestis not differentin principle.
A deeperresponsemustaddressthe properconstitutional
place
ofreligiousand nonreligiousclaims.If one believesthattheapprofor
samenessof treatment
priatepostureis one of equal regard,71
claimsthatare similarexceptin respectto a religiouscomponent,
one maysee thisstatuteas favoringand endorsingreligion.However,thetextoftheFree ExerciseClause and constitutional
history
is
warof
claims
that
some
protection
religious
special
suggest
ranted.And that approachcan be defendedwithoutdependency
on endorsement.In general,religiousbeliefsand practicesplace
demandson people thatare more intense,less subjectto reasons
that regulatecivil society,more likelyto generateconflictswith
the stateif not accommodated,than do nonreligiousbeliefsand
claimantsor deniedto religiousones,a courtwould (should)be influencedbythecomparativenumbers.For example,if the vast majorityof claimantsare predictablyreligious,the
schemeis betterseveredby an extensionthan by a denial to all claimants.
statutory
RestoFreedom
See
70
ChristopherL. Eisgruberand LawrenceG. Sager, WhytheReligious
69 NYU L Rev 437, 457-58, 472 (1994). See also MarkTushActIs Unconstitutional,
rationi
net, The EmergingPrinciple
ofAccommodationz
(Dubitante),76 Geo L J 1691, 1703 (1988).
"
448-50.
and
note
70
at
supra,
Sager,
Eisgruber
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Further,accommodationto those beliefsand practices
practices.72
be
may appropriatebecause the EstablishmentClause places particularlimitationson assistanceto religionthatit does not extend
to otherbeliefsand practices.73
Thus, one can supportaccommodationto religiousclaimsand the ReligiousFreedom Restoration
of religion,thatis,
Act withoutinvokingthe truthor superiority
withoutendorsingreligion.
Anotherconcern,expressedstronglyin Smith,involvesthe appropriatefunctionof courts.If courtsfindit impossibleto siftout
the power of religiousclaims and comparethemagainstgovernmentinterestsin applyinglaws to everybodytheycover,74
imposThe point
ing this task on courtsmay itselfbe unconstitutional.
can be cast as an objectionthatwhen inadequatelyguided courts
reward some religiousclaims and reject others,this
arbitrarily
amountsto an unacceptableestablishment
of religion.The conas involvingseparationofpowers:legiscernis putmoreforcefully
laturesmay not impose on courtsfunctionsjudges have decided
In eitherform,the argument
theyare unequippedto perform."7
for unconstitutionality
is not persuasive.Under the directionof
the SupremeCourt,courtsthroughoutthe countryemployedthe
compellinginteresttestforfreeexercisecases forroughlytwentysevenyears;some statecourtscontinueto interpret
theirstateconstitutionsas requiringthatstandard.Moreover,otherareas of law
requirejudgmentsof similardelicacyand difficulty.76
Perhaps,as
Scalia
less
and
Justice
keeps insisting,
open-ended
discretionary
standardsare more appropriateforcourts.But it would constitute
a startlingreversalof modern constitutional
law to declare that
thiswell-established,
formulation
is so defectivefor
long-standing
72See
18 Conn
JohnH. Garvey,FreeExerciseand theValuesofReligious
generally
Liberty,
L Rev 779 (1986); StephenPepper,A BrieffortheFreeExerciseClause,7 J Law & Religion
323, 346-52 (1989).
73See ChristopherL. Eisgruber,Madison'sWager:ReligiousLibertyin the Constitutional
Order,89 Nw U L Rev 347, 348 (1995); AbnerS. Greene,ThePoliticalBalanceoftheReligion
Clauses,102 Yale L J 1611 (1993).
74Eisgruberand Sager talkof the compellinginteresttestforfreeexercisecases as "unworkable,"note 70 at 484, 451, 466.
forRFRA
7 See JoanneC. Brant,TakingtheSupremeCourtat Its Word:The Implications
and SeparationofPowers,56 Mont L Rev 5 (1995).
76Compare Mary Ann Glendon and Raul F. Yanes, Structural
FreeExercise,90 Mich L
Rev 477, 523 (1991); Ira C. Lupu, The TroublewithAccommodation,
60 Geo Wash L Rev
Revisionism
and theSmithDecision,
743, 759-60 (1992); Michael W. McConnell,FreeExercise
57 U Chi L Rev 1109, 1144 (1990), withChoper (cited in note 36) at 677-79.
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use it, even
freeexercisecases thatcourtsmaynot constitutionally
when Congressdirectsthemto do so.
b) Congressional
power.Congressionalpower presentsthe most
Here we mustdistinguish
troublesomeissue of constitutionality.
between federaland state impingementson religious exercise.
has thepowerto setstandardsofinterpretation
Congressdefinitely
It may,in effect,
forreviewof actionsby the federalgovernment.
of
the
and
federal
statutesthatare
future)
qualify application (past
less generousto religiousclaimantsthanis the ReligiousFreedom
RestorationAct.77
Does Congress have the authorityto adopt a quasi-constituof freeexerciserights?
tionaltestforstateand local infringements
The hard question about the statute'svalidityis whetherCongress's "power to enforceby appropriatelegislation,the provisions" oftheFourteenthAmendment78
includesthepowerto grant
freeexerciserightsthatthe SupremeCourt has declinedto find.
Here we need to distinguish
"ends-means,"or remedial,extension fromexpansionof basic content.Without doubt, Congress
can create rightsnot grantedby the FourteenthAmendmentif
theseare needed to safeguardrightsthatare granted.If,forexample, Congress believed that police often lie about consent to
searches,Congress could adopt a law requiringwrittenconsent,
eventhoughtheFourthAmendment
(made applicableto thestates
by the FourteenthAmendment)does not directlyrequireconsent
to be written.
How would such a theoryworkhere?First,it mightbe argued
neutrallawswith
thatstatelegislaturesfrequently
adoptostensibly
but hidden,aims to harm unpopularreligious
unconstitutional,
that
would renderthe laws invalidif explicitlyreaims
groups,
vealedin preambles.Since courtsare unableto discovertheseaims
in ordinarylegal proceedings,Congressmay forestallthe success
of thisconcealedunconstitutional
behaviorbygrantingdirectprotectionsagainstneutrallaws.
To gauge the forceof this defenseof the ReligiousFreedom
77Althoughit mightbe argued that Congress wants a uniformstandardfor state and
withfreeexercise,and that,therefore,
federalinterferences
federalapplicationsshouldnot
be upheldunless stateapplicationsare also valid,by farthe betterview is thatthe federal
applicationsstand,whateverthe conclusionabout congressionalpowerto determinestandards forreviewingstatelaws.
? 5.
7S US Const, AmendXWV,
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RestorationAct,one mustmeasuretheActagainstthebroadrange
of cases thatit reaches.Withoutperforming
thisexercise,I rather
doubt that many cases can plausiblybe covered by this sort of
ends-meansconnection.To takethe circumstances
of Employment
Divisionv Smith,statelegislaturesdo not forbiduse of peyotein
orderto harmreligiousgroups(mostlyNative American)thatuse
peyotein worship.Douglas Laycock has suggestedthat an endmeansjustification
can supportthe entirestatute,evenifthe justificationreaches only a small percentageof cases;79but I do not
believethe justification
can be stretchedthatfar.If the greatmaof
of
jority applications the act do not plausiblyprotectpeople
laws or statepractices,the act cannotbe
againstunconstitutional
sustainedon thatbasis.8"
A morecomplexand debatableversionoftheends-meanstheory
assertsthat an objectiveof the Religion Clauses and the Equal
ProtectionClause is to assurethatreligionsare treatedequally.81
and inattentionas
Equal treatmentis threatenedby indifference
well as purposefuldiscrimination.82
Legislatorswho would never
burdens
on
dominant
faiths
impose
maycasuallyimposesuch burdens on fringereligions,eitherunawareof,or unconcernedabout,
this effectof a generallaw. Legislaturesenactingprohibitionsof
use of alcohol alwaysmade exceptionsforsacramentaluse of wine
by Christians;legislaturesenactingprohibitionsof use of peyote
have oftenfailedto exceptsacramentaluse forNative American
churches.The Court in Smithnotedthat"leavingaccommodation
to the politicalprocesswill place at a relativedisadvantagethose
or ten percentof the cases involve
79He says,"Congress need not findthatninety,fifty
violationsunder the Supreme Court's definition.Even under a purelyremedialtheory,
Congressneed findonlythatthereare enoughsuch violationsto justifycongressionalaction." Laycock (cited in note 33) at 167.
80I do not pause to engage two questionsabout ends-meansjustification
and general
werevery
validity.If the percentageof instancessupportableby an ends-meansjustification
high,probablythe statutewould be valideven fortheunusualinstanceswhenthatjustification seemedirrelevant.
If the percentageof instancessupportableby an ends-meansjustificationwere substantial(but not veryhigh),thatprobablywould be sufficient
to preserve
the law on its face as applied to statecases; applications,
however,mightbe held invalidif
neither ends-means nor any other valid justificationwere forthcomingfor those
circumstances.
81One mightview this theoryas a combinationof modestexpansionof basic content
plus ends-means,since the SupremeCourt has not held, and mightnot hold on its own,
thatinequalityof consideration
of the sortI describeviolatestheConstitutionin anysense.
82To drawan analogyto criminallaw concepts,one may treatindifference
as like recklessnessand inattentionas like negligence.
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religiouspracticesthat are not widely engaged in. . "83 As
Thomas Berg has suggested,84
the ReligiousFreedomRestoration
Act may enable minorityreligionsto achievethroughthe judicial
processwhatdominantreligionsobtainthroughthe politicalprocess. Perhapslegislativefailuresto accord equal treatmentto minorityreligionscan be viewed eitheras unconstitutional,
though
not subjectto correctionthroughjudicialenforcement
ofconstitutionalnorms,or as at odds withbasic constitutional
values,though
not strictly
In eitherevent,85
unconstitutional.
the ReligiousFreedom RestorationAct mightsupplya broad remedyforsuch failures.
This rationalewouldcovera highpercentageofinstancesarising
underthe act"6and would justifythe entireact,ifit is convincing.
The difficulty
lies in the premisethat legislativeindifference
or
inattentionviolatesthe Constitution,or comes close enough to
bringthe ends-meanslogic intoplay.To defendthe premise,one
would draw:fromclaimsthattheConstitution
imposesbroadoblion
to
vote
for
relevantreagations legislators(e.g.,
constitutionally
that
cannot
be
enforced
from
extensive
sons)
effectively
by courts;
in
liability the criminallaw forrecklessnessand negligence;and
fromthe rule thatthe Title VII restriction
on discrimination
may
be violated(withoutproofof consciousdiscrimination)
by use of
teststhathave a disproportionate
impactand are not requiredby
businessnecessity.87
Opposed to the premisemaybe the standard
viewthatconsciousdiscrimination
alone violatesthe Constitution;
but thisoppositionis completeonlyif "consciousdiscrimination"
is takento mean a desireor aim to discriminate
and not to include
conscious indifference
to unjustifiedcomparativedisadvantage.
Smithappearsto rejectoutrightthe premisethatlegislativeindif494 US at 890.
An Interpretive
Guideto theReligious
84Thomas C. Berg, WhatHath CongressWrought?
FreedomRestoration
Act,39 Vill L Rev 21 -22 (1994). See also McConnell (cited in note
76) at 1132.
ofcourse,ifthe"failures"are regardedas actually
s The argumentforvalidityis stronger,
unconstitutional.
86
Since membersof dominantreligions,and dominantchurches,can also make claims
underthe act, thistheorywould not cover all situations.
com7 Griggsv Duke Power,401 US 424 (1971). JesseChoper providesan illuminating
in Religionand Race UndertheConstitution:
parison of religiousand racial discrimination
79 Cornell L Rev 49 (1994).
Similarities
and Differences,
8'
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ferenceto minorityreligionsis unconstitutional;
it leaves minorto
the
ities
majoritarianpoliticalprocess.However,the language
of the opinionin Smithfocuseson the constitutional
responsibilities of courts.The willingnessof theJusticesto assignminorities
to an unsympathetic
politicalprocess may be interpretedas not
the
constitutional
of legislaaddressing underlying
responsibilities
tors.Nevertheless,the tone of the Smithopinionoffersless promise forthispremisethanit deserves.A sensitiveview of whatthe
Constitutioncoversshouldincludeat leastself-conscious
indifference to the plightto religiousminorities.
For Justiceswho are not persuadedto accept this premise,the
act will be valid againststatesonly if anotherrationalesupports
it. The criticalissue is whetherCongresshas some power to expand the contentof constitutional
rightsthe Court has declared.
Put differently,
once the Court has definedthe contentof FourteenthAmendmentrights,mayCongressdefinethose rightsmore
broadly?
I have alreadymentionedone way the Court mightaccede to
the approachof Congress.The Justicescould say,in effect,"We
resolveda difficult
issue aboutfreeexercisein Smith.Congresshas
indicatedits overwhelming
opinion thatour resolutionwas misconceived.We now reconsiderthe issue in lightof our 'dialogue'
with Congress.We findourselvespersuadedthat our resolution
was mistaken,and we adopt the compellingintereststandardas
the appropriateconstitutional
guide." On this approach,theJustices would give some deferenceto Congress,but would retain
forappropriateprinciplesof review.They would not
responsibility
apply a legislativestandardof reviewat variancewith one they
could accept as constitutionally
required.Congress appropriately
indicatesitsviewsof the Court'sconstitutional
holdings,and these
viewsshouldcarrysome weightwiththeJustices.Let us suppose,
however,that Justiceswho joined Smith are not persuaded to
conclusions.
change theirconstitutional
Does Congresshave some independentauthorityto definethe
scope of rightsunderthe FourteenthAmendment?If one focuses
on the ordinarylinguisticsignificance
of "power to enforce,"this
seemsdoubtful.Enforcingrightsdoes not seem to implyauthority
to broadenthe rightsthemselves.Nevertheless,a fairlystrongargumentsupportssuch authorityin Congress. When the Four-
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teenthAmendmentwas adopted,Congresswas conceivedas the
to implementit. Those who approvedthe
branchof government
Amendmentdid not look to the SupremeCourt thathad decided
It may be
Dred Scottas a major engine for achievingequality.88
reasonableto inferthatCongresshas the powerto interpret
rights
in orderto expandthembeyondwhat the Court has concluded89
the Constitutiongrants.
But if Congressmay expandrightsbeyondwhatthe Court has
Most constideclared,mayit also contractrights?Not necessarily.
tutionalrightsare countermajoritarian
protectionsagainstlegislatures.If it allows Congressto narrowrights,the Court accedes to
at the nationallevel thatit has rejected
majoritarianrestrictions
at the statelevel. When Congress"expandsrights,"the national
legislaturetells state legislaturestheymay not restrictindividual
behaviorthatthe Court has leftthemfreeto control.
difference
betweenlegislationexpandingand
This fundamental
but does it matter?There are
limitingrightsis straightforward,
three,relatedanswers.One answerstartsfroma tough-minded
realismthat federalpowersunder the Commerce and Spending
Clauses alreadyhavebeen stretchedso farthathardlyanyjudicially
enforceableprotectionsof stateauthorityagainstfederalinterference remain.90If thatis so, we shouldnotworryaboutminoradditionalerosionsof statepowerbroughtabout by generouscongresof the FourteenthAmendment.The second
sional interpretations
conceiveda drasticshift
answeris thattheFourteenthAmendment
of authorityfromstatesto Congress.The thirdanswerrestson
what are commonlycalled "the political safeguardsof federalism."91Membersof Congressare electedwithinstates.When proin unacceptableways,fedposals are made to erode stateauthority
eral legislatorswill manifesttheiropposition.The stateshave a
" Laycock (cited in note 33) at 157-63.
* The basic issue of
poweris the same whetherthe Court has alreadytakena position
in the textby talkingof
issue. I simplify
or wouldtakethatpositionon the constitutional
positionsalreadytaken.
90The Court did, however,decide in the last termthatan assertedCommerce Clause
UnitedStatesv Lopez,115 S Ct 1624 (1995).
was insufficient.
justification
9' See William Cohen, Congressional
27
Due Process
and Equal Protection,
PowertoInterpret
in Principles,
Stan L Rev 603 (1975); HerbertWechsler,ThePoliticalSafeguards
ofFederalism,
andFundamental
Law 49-82 (1961). It is sometimessuggestedthatCongress'sability
Politics,
to findfactsalso supportsa "one-wayrachet,"but a special capacityto findfactsmight
lead to limitingdeclaredrightsas well as expandingthem.
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in Congressthatminoritieslack.Thus, the
politicalrepresentation
the
Court
should accept FourteenthAmendment
argumentgoes,
enforcement
that
legislation
impingeson statepower.92
The SupremeCourt has neverresolvedthe preciseissue of federalpowerthatthe ReligiousFreedomRestorationAct raises.The
v Morgan.93The Courthad
mostimportant
precedentis Katzenbach
earliersustainedagainstFourteenthAmendmentchallengea state
requirementthatvotersbe literatein English.Congressprovided
that no one who completessixth grade in an "American-flag"
school may be denied the rightto vote because he or she is not
literatein English,thus affording
manyPuerto Ricans a rightto
vote in New York despitethe state'srequirementof Englishliteracy.JusticeBrennanwrote that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
AmendmentgrantsCongressbroadpowerslikethosefoundin the
Necessary and Proper Clause. The Court reasoned that voting
maycombatotherformsof discrimination
againstPuertoRicansI have discussed.94
a versionof the ends-meansjustification
The
Court needed only "to perceivea basis upon whichthe Congress
mightresolvethe conflictas it did."95
JusticeBrennancontinuedthat the resultwas the same if the
legislationwas aimed merely"at the eliminationof an invidious
in establishing
He referred
discrimination
voterqualifications."
to
some possiblefactualconclusionsby Congress,such as thatvoters
mightbe adequatelyinformedby Spanish-languagenewspapers,
radio,and television.But he also spoke directlyto the assessment
of values thatis centralto constitutional
adjudication."Congress
mighthave also questionedwhetherdenial of a rightdeemed so
in our societywas a necessaryor appropreciousand fundamental
of
means
priate
encouragingpersonsto learn English,or of furthe
The
thering goal of an intelligentexerciseof the franchise.""96
prerogativeto weigh competingconsiderationswas Congress's;
92 One rejoinderto thisargument
is thatpoliticalrepresentation
maybe unavailingifone
or a few stateswant to order theiraffairsin a mannerthe otherstatesdislike;but this
rejoinderhas no relevancehere. The ReligiousFreedom RestorationAct receivednearly
unanimoussupport;it will affectlegislativeand executivedecisionsin all states,and was
not directedat practicesfoundin onlya fewstates.
93 384 US 641 (1966).
94Id at 652-53.
95
96

Id at 653.
Id at 654.
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"again,it is enoughthatwe perceivea basisupon whichCongress
mightpredicatea judgmentthat the applicationof New York's
. .. constituted
an invidiousdiscrimiEnglishliteracyrequirement
thatthe Court's
nation.... "97 Directlyaddressingthe possibility
resolutionmightallow Congressto restrictor diluterights,
Justice
Brennansaid thatwouldnot be enforcement:
"? 5 grantsCongress
no power to restrict,abrogate,or dilutethese guarantees."98
He said
JusticeHarlan, joined by JusticeStewart,dissented.99
Congresscould undoubtedlypass remediallegislation,but the dewhethera constitutional
commandhad been violated
termination
was forthe courts,not Congress.
Katzenbachv Morgan clearlysupportsthe Religious Freedom
RestorationAct. One can reason thatCongressdecided afterextensivetestimonythatthe value of religiousexercisenecessitates
a compellingintereststandard.The Court can easily"perceivea
basis" upon which Congressreachedthatconclusion.Moreover,
Katzenbach
v Morgandoes not standalone. In significant
cases unthe Court
der both the Fourteenthand ThirteenthAmendments,
of Congressto expandrightsbehas acknowledgedthe authority
yond those it has foundor would findby itself.'0
Still,it is farfromcertainthatthe Court will extendKatzenbach
v Morganand itssuccessorsto justifythenew act. Distinctionsare
possible.First,factualjudgmentsmay have playeda much larger
role in adoptionof the literacystatute,and otherpriorstatutes,
withthe
than in the new act, whichmainlyrevealsdisagreement
values. Second, the new act
Court's assessmentof constitutional
directsthe courtsto applyan open-endedstandardinvolvingdifficult discretionary
judgmentsacrossa wide rangeof circumstances;
97Id at 656.
98Id at 651.
9 Id at 659-71. Insofaras the majority'sopinionrestedon possiblefactualconclusions
Congressmighthavereached,JusticeHarlan said thesewereunsupportedby anylegislative
record.
448 US 448
v Bitzer,427 US 445 (1976); Fullilovev Klutznick,
100See, e.g., Fitzpatrick
(1980); Jonesv AlfredH. Mayer Co., 392 US 409 (1968). See generallyLaurence Tribe,
AmericanConstitutional
Law (2d ed, 1988), ?? 5-14; ArchibaldCox, Foreword:
Constitutional
80 Harv L Rev 91 (1966); ScottC. Idleman,
and thePromotion
Adjudication
ofHumanRights,
Act:PushingtheLimitsofLegislative
The Religious
FreedomRestoration
Power,73 Tex L Rev
247 (1994); Matt Pawa, WhentheSupremeCourtRestricts
Constitutional
Rights,Can Congress
141 U Pa L Rev 1029
Save Us? An Examination
Amendment,
ofSection5 oftheFourteenth
is by no meansall in one direction.These authorsdiscusscases and
(1993). The authority
individualopinionsthatproposea more limitedview of Congressionalpower.
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the literacylaw and othershad dealtmorepreciselywithnarrower
And third,the new act concernsthe "incorsetsof circumstances.
Free
Exercise
Clause ratherthan the flexibleconstituporated"
tional standardof equal protection.1o0
Anycontentionthatfederalpowershouldbe radicallydifferent
forincorporatedrightsthanforequal protectionrightsis not very
the relationshipof Congressto the Court shouldbe parforceful;
allel for all rightsenforcedby Congress under the Fourteenth
Amendment.Further,guaranteesof religious rightsare largely
and maybe justifiedas an aspectof equal
guaranteesforminorities,
In
protection. principle,Congressshould be able to directcourts
to employbroad standardsas well as more preciseones; and its
authorityto implementFourteenthAmendmentrightsbeyond
what the Court has declareddoes not restsolelyon some special
fact-finding
capacity.Thus, the mostsubstantialargumentfordistinguishing
Morganand its successorsis thatthe ReligiousFreedom RestorationAct restson a disagreement
withthe Court,that
the
constitutional
Congress rejects
judgment of the Supreme
Court outright,
ratherthanbuildingupon whatthe Court has decided.102Congress, the argumentgoes, has authorityunder the
FourteenthAmendmentto cooperatewiththe Court in elaboratbut not to oppose its basic judgmentsabout
ing relevantnorms,1o3
constitutionalvalues.104However, some of the previousacts of
Congress that have been sustainedare not neatlycategorizedas
v Morganfolloweda Court decisionsuscooperative.Katzenbach
a
taining literacytest;Congresssaid thatsuch testscould not be
In anothercase,01s
appliedin certaincircumstances.
Congressprotectedequal treatmentof women,althoughup to thatpoint the
Court had said thatgenderclassifications
needed to be supported
0o'However,in Huttov Finney,
437 US 678 (1978), theCourtupheldcongressionalauthorizationof attorneysfeesin an EighthAmendmentcivilrightssuit,withJusticeRehnquist
dissenting.The case is discussedin Pawa (cited in note 100) at 1095-96.
102Eisgruberand Sager (cited in note 70), at 445, talkof the statuteas "at war withthe
SupremeCourt's constitutional
judgment."
103 Samuel Estreicher,
Powerand Constitutional
on Proposed
Congressional
Rights:Reflections
"HumanLife"Legislation,
68 Va L Rev 333, 427 (1982), talksof Congress's"abilityto assist
the Courtin elaboratingconstitutional
norms ." as one basisforCongressionalauthority.
...
04Eisgruberand Sager (note 70 at 462) write,"Congressis not empowered. . . to command the Court to yield to congressionaljudgmentsabout eitherthe letteror the spirit
of the Constitution'sliberty-bearing
provisions."
v Bitzer,427 US 445 (1976).
Fitzpatrick
0o5
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the recentact does not
onlyby a rationalbasis. More important,
fitunambiguouslyinto the oppositionmode. Afterall, the Supreme Court in Smithapprovedlegislativeaccommodationsand
expressedsome concernabout the unequal treatmentof religious
The Court'smainconcernwas thatjudgescould not
minorities.106
sensiblyapplythe compellingintereststandard.Legislativeaction
mitigatesthatconcernabout the judicial function.1'7When both
Congressand thePresidentindicatetheywantcourtsto use a test,
theriskis lessenedthatthejudiciarywilltrespasson politicalfunctions.Finally,Congresshas adopteda standardthatthe Supreme
Court announcedand purportedto employformorethantwentyfiveyearsand thatfourJusticesacceptedin Smith.The act hardly
representsoppositionto the Court's normativeevaluationsover
time. Given all this,the act is in reasonablecontinuitywiththe
Supreme Court's work. It is highlydoubtfulthat cooperation,
ratherthan opposition,should be a requisiteof rightsexpansion
under Section 5; in any event,this act is sufficiently
cooperative
to pass muster.
withpriorlaw and appropriaterelationsbeAlthoughcontinuity
tweenCongressand the Court underthe FourteenthAmendment
call forvalidationof the ReligiousFreedomRestorationAct as it
applies to state laws and practices,108some Justiceswill be perfromany resuaded thatthe issue is importantly
distinguishable
solved by prior cases, and otherswill adhere to the dissenters'
stancein Morganthatthe Court,not Congress,decideswhat acThe fateof the act as
tionsviolatethe FourteenthAmendment.109
is decidedlyuncertain.10
it appliesto stateand local governments
interest
test?The Court mighthold the new
2. Whatcompelling
act valid, but give it a grudgingapplication.One strategyfor
106Moreover,it did not assertthatits rule was moreconsonant
withthe languageof the
rulerequiringsome
FirstAmendmentand thehistoryleadingup to it thana constitutional
accommodationto religiousexercise.See McConnell (cited in note 76) at 1115-16.
07 See Berg (cited in note 84) at 28.
The principlethatwould extendMorganto the ReligiousFreedom RestorationAct
80s
of
would also cover propertyrights.Suppose the Court rendersa narrowinterpretation
rightsnot to be deprivedof propertywithoutdue process.A RepublicanCongressmight
expandpropertyrights.Such action mightbe supportedunder the CommerceClause in
any event,but an expansiveview of Congress'spower underthe FourteenthAmendment
would also sustainsuch legislation.
109For cases supportingthisview,see the treatiseand articlescited in note 100.
10See Idleman
(cited in note 100) at 304.
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achievingthis-declaringthatreligionshouldnot be a permissible
basis of categorizationforbenefitsor burdens11'
and thataccommodationsto religiousclaims generallyamountto impermissible
establishments-wouldrender the act ineffective,
because governmentswould then have a compellinginterestin not creating
exemptions.This strategyis not open because the Court has
supportedwide legislativechoice about when to make most accommodationsto religiousexercise.
A second strategyfor narrow application arises out of the
Court's argumentin Smithof the ill wisdomand the difficulty
for
review
of
the
In
interest
test.
of
that
difjudicial
compelling
light
Justicesmightconclude theyshould defergenerouslyto
ficulty,
governmentassertionsof compellinginterestand least restrictive
means,sustainingthemunless irrational.A variationon this apburproach would be to findthatfewrestrictions
"substantially
den" the exerciseof religion.
Neither varietyof the second strategyhas much appeal. The
of applyinga compellinginteresttestis hardlya justifidifficulty
cation fordecliningto applyit, in the guise of extremedeference
to government
claims.Congressevidentlysupposesthatmanyrestrictions
do substantially
burdenreligiousexercise.Moreover,because Smithobjectsto anyanalysisof whatis centralto a religion
or whethera burdenon religionis significant,
Justiceswho joined
that opinion should be uncomfortable
concludingthatmost sincere religiousclaims do not asserta substantialburden.112
Justicesinclinedto read the statutenarrowlymightemphasize
all the doctrinespriorto Smiththatlimitedtheimportofthe comcommendationof the test
pellinginteresttest,takingthe statutory
"as set forthin priorFederalcourtrulings"as implicitly
adopting
those limitingdoctrines.In thisway,the Court could developthe
law to give the statuterelativelylittleforce."3
"' See Philip Kurland,Of Churchand Stateand theSupremeCourt,29 U Chi L Rev 1
theAccommodation
(1961); StevenG. Gey, WhyIs ReligionSpecial?Reconsidering
ofReligion
UndertheReligionClausesoftheFirstAmendment,
52 U PittL Rev 75 (1990); MarkTushnet,
and
Church
State
and
the
Court":
Kurland
1989
Review
Court
Revisited,
"Of
Supreme
Supreme
373.
"2
They could,however,consistently
saythat"substantialburden"is a bad testforjudges
but one Congresshas powerto impose,and thatthe testhappensto ruleout mostreligious
claims.
113 For any assessmentwhetherthis may happen, it helps to
recognizethat of the five
Justiceswho remainon the Court fromthe time of Smith,all exceptJusticeO'Connor
joinedJusticeScalia's opinion(i.e., Scalia, Rehnquist,Stevens,Kennedy).Moreover,Justice
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The seriousissuesof interpretation
thatthe statuteraisesfollow
the lines of the threestrategiesthe Court used priorto Smithto
renderthe compellinginteresttestless exactingthenit appeared.
does thelaw do aboutweakapplication,evasion,
What,ifanything,
and thresholddenial?1141 shall examineeach of these,aftera general commentabout how the statuterelatesto the pre-Smithlaw.
The act's findingscharacterize"the compellinginteresttestas
set forthin prior(to Smith)Federal courtrulings"as "a workable
test for strikingsensible balances between religiouslibertyand
interests."One of the act's purposesis
competinggovernmental
restore
the
and
"to
compellinginteresttestas set forth"in Sherbert
Yoder.This statutory
connectsthestatuteto
languagetransparently
and purposesmay
priorlaw. However,thejunctureof thefindings
be thoughtto raise this problem:Sherbert
and Yoderrepresented
the high-water
markof protectionof religiousliberty;subsequent
cases reflecteda serious weakening.Is the Court to apply the
strongstandardof the earliercases or the weak standardof later
cases? For what it is worth,the more specificpurposessection
should be given greaterweightthan the findingssection;"sbut
I believe this mannerof conceivingthe issue is itselfsomewhat
misleading.What is most importantis thatthe statutedoes not
endorseparticularpre-Smithresultsand rejectothers;'6Congress
has not decidedjust how stringentthe standardof reviewshould
be. The languageof Sherbert
and Yodersoundspowerfully
protecintertive,but the resultsin thosecases impingedon government
ests only to a modest degree."' In no freeexercisecase has the
Thomas has so farvotedwithJusticeScalia in everyReligionClause case in whichhe has
participated,
mayindicatea favorableattialthoughhis concurringopinionin Rosenberger
tude towardaccommodationsof religion.Rosenberger
v Rectorand Visitors
ofthe University
of Virginia,115 S Ct 2510, 2528-33 (1995). A majorityreadyto give the act a crabbed
readingmay be in hand.
Freedom
Restora"4 See Ira Lupu, Of Timeand theRFRA:A Lawyer'sGuidetotheReligious
tionAct,56 Mont L Rev 171 (1995) (speakingof the "burdens,""enclaves,"and "strict
scrutiny"questions).
"' See Laycockand Thomas (citedin note 57) at 224. The minority
reportin the House
Committeecommentingon different
draftlanguagesaid the law did not restorethe law
to the "high-watermark,"House Comm on theJudiciary,
ReligiousFreedomRestoration
Act of 1993, HR Rep No 88, 103d Cong, 1st Sess 15 (1993), but thatis an unreliable
indicationof the majority'saims.
ReligiousFreedom RestorationAct of 1993,
" See Senate Committeeon theJudiciary,
S Rep No 111, 103 Cong, 1st Sess 6 (1993).
some moneyand administrative
costs the government
inconvenience;Yoder,
"7Sherbert
coveringa verysmall religioussect,has almostno practicalimpacton the largersociety,
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Supreme Court thwarteda substantialgovernmentinterest."18
Thus, the "high-water"markof Sherbertand Yodermay be less
high than the languageof the opinionsintimates.Courts should
look at the whole course of decisionsfromSherbert
up to Smith,
to givecontentto the statutory
thatConlanguage,understanding
meant
to
to
claimants.
gress
give significant
protection religious
I turnnow to the threestrategies,
and the statutory
responseto
them.Evasion (or avoidance)formilitaryand prisoncases is easiest. The operativelanguagecontainsno exceptionforsuch cases.
An exceptionforprisonswas suggestedand rejected.119The Senate
Reportindicatesthatnone was intended.120The statuteappliesthe
compellingintereststandardto militaryand prisoncases. What it
leaves open is whethersome special degree of deferenceshould
be accordedmilitaryand prisonauthorities
in definingcompelling
interestsand determining
how theyshould be satisfied.121
Congress's responseto the strategyof thresholddenial is less
The act grantsprotectiononlywhen government
straightforward.
"substantiallyburden[s]a person's exerciseof religion,"that is,
"the exerciseof religionunderthe FirstAmendment. ."
The act definitely
does not demandthatpeople claim...thatchalrestrictions
forcethemto violatereligiousoblilengedgovernment
It
is
sufficient
that
gations.122
theyhavestrongreligiousreasonsfor
the behaviorin whichtheywantto engage.The languagereflectsa
choice to protectmore than outrightconflictsbetweenreligious
obligationand statecoercion.123
have a powerfulinterestin the fulleducaalthoughone mightarguethatstategovernments
tion of each child.
"' Between
and Yoder,it rejectedthe freeexerciseclaimof a selectiveconscienSherbert
tiousobjector,Gillette
v UnitedStates,401 US 437 (1971), although,in myjudgment,granting the claim would not have posed a veryseriousthreatto the draftsystem.See GreenaAtAll: TheDefeatofSelective
Conscientious
1971 SupremeCourt
walt,All orNothing
Objection,
Review 31, 76.
119
The process,includingAttorneyGeneral Reno's oppositionto an exception,is describedbrieflyin Laycock and Thomas (cited in note 57) at 239-43.

Sen Rep (cited in note 116) at 9-10.
The Senate Report,id at 10, talksof courtscontinuing"to give due deferenceto the
experienceand expertiseof prisonand jail administrators
... ." It containssimilarlanguage
about militaryauthorities.Id at ? E, pp 11-12.
122
Anotherpointthatis clear,althoughnot perhapsfromthe languageitself,is thatthe
act protectschurchesand otherreligiousinstitutions,
as well as individuals.Laycock and
Thomas (note 57) at 234-36. These organizationsqualifyas "persons" in legalese;even if
theydid not,a claimby an organizationwould constitutea claimbyitsindividualmembers.
120
121

123

See id at 231-34.
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"Substantiallyburden" connotessome measureof magnitude.
Does it also impose a thresholdabout the kindof burdenthatis
involved?We can focusthisquestionby consideringthe decision
in Lyng.As noted earlier,the Court in Lyngsaid thatthe Indian
ofreligiousexercise,
tribeshad not claimeda relevantinfringement
because no coercionwas involved.The new act does not seemto
requiredirector indirectcoercion.If theland developmentin Lyng
would have been devastatingfor the religiouspracticesof some
tribes,a possibilitythe Court concedes,theirexerciseof religion
burdened.On the otherhand,perhapsthe term
was substantially
and the referenceto "the exerciseof reliburden"
"substantially
includethe idea of a
Amendment"
the
First
under
implicitly
gion
threshrelevantburden,thuseffectively
preserving
constitutionally
on
old barriersof the Lyngvariety.The statutory
language, bala
"coercion"
threshold.The
does
not
to
ance,
appear incorporate
in
on thisisdifferent
directions
House and Senate Reportspoint
sue.124 The Court should proceed withoutany fixedassumption
thatclaimantsmustestablishcoercionof a particularsort,but it
should remain open to contentionsthat "substantiallyburden"
may involvesomethresholds.125
124
thedoctrine
The SenateReport(note116)at 6, 9, saysthattheactdoesnotaffect
burdenon religion.
of landplacesno cognizable
in Lyngthatgovernment
development
actionswhichhavea substantial
The HouseReport(note115)at 6 says,"Allgovernment
inthisbill."
ofreligion
wouldbe subjectto therestrictions
on thepractice
external
impact
476US 693(1986);
v Roy,
The tworeports
areinaccordononeoftheissuesposedbyBowen
record
would
internal
forpurely
number
tousea socialsecurity
forthegovernment
keeping
notsubstantially
burden
DouglasLaycockandOliverThomastakethetworeports
religion.
themoregenerallanguage
oftheHouseReportbeing
ofLyng,
theapproach
as accepting
See LaycockandThomas(citedinnote57) at228totheproblem
ofautopsies.
responsive
inLyngsaidthata religious
claimmetthethreshold
Brennan's
dissent
30.However,
Justice
identi485US at470.The nearly
external
effects."
ifthechallenged
actionhad"substantial
thantotheLyngmajority.
oftheHouseReportfallsmuchclosertothedissent
callanguage
on
sitesofNativeAmerican
to protect
The subsequent
worship
proposaloflegislation
landprovides
veryslightsupportfortheviewthattheReligiousFreedom
government
Cultural
ActleavesLyngintact.See Sen Rep S2269on The NativeAmerican
Restoration
andFreeExerciseofReligionActof 1994,103dCong,2d Sess(1994).
Protection
as valid,
thestatute
Scaliatreats
count?IfJustice
How muchdoesthelegislative
history
in Congress
fromconsiderinternal
deliberations
andfollows
hisusualcourseofexcluding
a law thatmoreexpansively
end up finding
ation,he might
rejectshis approachto the
attention
to legislative
whopaygreater
Overall,
history.
ReligionClausesthando Justices
is morefavorable
to theviewthatLyngremains
thelegislative
goodlawthanis the
history
If one assignsgreatimportance
to thelanguageandmoderate
weight
statutory
language.
that
inmyview,theCourtwillnotconclude
theproperapproach
to thelegislative
history,
thelawleavesLynguntouched.
125For example,
concerns
aboutinternal
government
mayfail.See note
record-keeping
threshold
ofnecessary
124.AsIraLupushowedina 1989article
(citedinnote42),notions
thatconcenHe thensuggested
an approach
refined.
havenotbeenverycarefully
burdens
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A showingthata rule "substantially
burdens"religiousexercise
more
than
a
trivial
effect.126
obviouslyrequires
Suppose a church
thatplaysmusicveryloud and disturbsneighborsis told thatordinarynuisancelaw requiresit to lower the volume. If it responds
thatmusicis an importantpartof itsservicesand thatthe original
volumebestexpressesits religioussensibility,
but thatthe permitted volumeis onlyslightlyless desirable,the restriction
would not
constitutea substantialburden.On the otherhand, suppose that
a law forbiddingdrinkingof alcohol makesno exceptionforwine
duringcommunion.The churchrespondsthatwine is important
and foritsphysicaleffect,
butnot an absoluteprereqsymbolically
uisite for effectivecommunion.Here the burdenis substantial.
Much more would be sacrificedby compliancethan in the first
case. An inquiryinto substantialburden,like an inquiryinto centrality,does requiresome appraisalof more or less importantaspectsof a religion.The flavorof the two phrasessuggeststhatthe
hurdle for claimantsshowinga substantialburdenon theirreligious exerciseis somewhatlower than fora substantialthreatto
centralaspects of their religion(JusticeBrennan'sapproach in
Lyng).Courtsinquiringabout substantialburdenmustmaketheir
assessmentfromthe perspectiveof the sincerereligiousclaimants;
resolvedisputesamongadherentsof the
theyneed not (ordinarily)
same religion.
What can one say about the statute'scompellinginteresttest,
means" component?127
withits crucial"least restrictive
I shall first
trateson whetheran interference
would violatesome commonlaw right,if committedby
a privateparty,withfurther
protectionfor"entitlements"(likeunemployment
compensaThe claimantsin Lyngmightqualifyundera commonlaw
tion),and againstdiscrimination.
approachon a theoryof easement.
126
burden"an inquiryinto"centrality"
byanothername?JusticeO'ConIS "substantially
nor apparentlythinksnot. She objectedin Lyngto approachesthatwould requireassessing
yetin Smithshe arguedfora testofwhethera burdenis "constitutionally
centrality,
significant." Conceivably,she meant"constitutionally
to excludeonlythose burdens
significant"
thatfailto be of the relevantconstitutional
type,such as the burdenin Lyng;but thephrase
of magnitudeas well.JusticeScalia's opinionin Smithindicatesthat
suggestsa requirement
is an inquiryaboutcentrality
"constitutionally
significant"
byanothername.Whatevermay
be trueofO'Connor's phrase"constitutionally
burden,"thephrase"substantially
significant
burden" is definitely
mainlyone of magnitude.
127
The relationbetweenburdenand governmentinterestwarrantsbriefmention.The
test the act adopts involvestwo steps.The initialinquiryabout "substantialburden" can
interestin imposinga burden.
apparentlybe decidedwithoutreferenceto thegovernment's
The inquiryaboutthegovernment's
interestand themeansof itssatisfaction
can apparently
be assessed withoutfurtherconsiderationof the burden.Imagine that in two cases the
has equallystronginterestsand equallystrongclaimsthatno alternative
means
government
will suffice:in case 1, the burdenon religionis barelysubstantial;in case 2, the burdenis
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ask if the testshould be appliedmore rigorouslythanin the past
and then addressmore specificproposalsabout content.
UnitedStatesv Lee, in which the Court employeda less than
stringentversionof the compellinginteresttest and rejectedthe
claim of Amishemployersforan exemptionfromsocial security
taxes,helps framethe general question.One can argue that the
statuterefersin itsmainoperativelanguageto the ordinary,
highly
compellinginteresttest,used mostnotablyin racialclasstringent,
sificationand freespeechcases. The languagein the purposessecand Yodermay seem consonantwiththisline;
tion about Sherbert
those cases set fortha standardthat sounds fairlystringentand
yieldedvictoriesforreligiousclaimants.Furthersupportmay be
gleaned fromChurchofLukumiBabalu Aye,in which the Court
talkedof the need for "interestsof the highestorder" and said
thatits compellingintereststandard"reallymeanswhatit says."'28
This argumentfora highlystringent
testis not persuasive.The
statutehas in view the compellinginteresttestas it has been applied in the freeexercisearea. The law reflectsno judgmentthat
whenthe Supreme Court and othercourtshave applied the test
and sustainedgovernmentregulation,as they oftenhave done,
done a faultyjob. This conclusionthatContheyhaveconsistently
to
resultslikeLee is supportedbya fundadid
not
mean
undo
gress
betweenmostfreeexerciseclaimsand the equal
mentaldifference
and
free
speech claims againstwhich the government
protection
satisfies
the
rarely
compellinginteresttest.For the latter,a court
examineswhethera law willbe uphelddespitea presumptypically
or regulation
feature-a racialclassification
tivelyunconstitutional
of the contentof speech. For analogouscases of religiousclassificationor discrimination
againstreligion,like ChurchoftheLukumi
the
BabaluAye,
applied.
compellinginteresttestis also stringently
Typical freeexerciseclaims are different;
theyinvolveassertions
If a courtrespondedpreciselyas the conceptsinstruct,
the twocases would
verysubstantial.
have identicalresults.This, however,is nothow thingsactuallywork. Courts assess the
strengthof a governmentinterestand the adequacy of alternativemeans in lightof the
burdenimposed.If the burdenis verygreat,courtswill be more demandingin theirappraisalof the governmentinterestand the means it has chosen. See Berg (cited in note
84) at 51. It is a matterfordebatewhethera courtshould tryto look at each side of the
scale in succession(as the statutory
see the
languageindicates),or shouldself-consciously
issue as weighingeach side againstthe other.Realismcounselsthatcomparativeweighing
takesplace, whateverjudges say and self-consciously
tryto do.
"28Church theLukumiBabalu
of
Ayev CityofHialeah, 113 S Ct 2217, 2233 (1993).

8]

QUO VADIS: THE STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF "TESTS"

357

that individualsshould receive exemptionsfromgenerallyvalid
worriedabout incentivesto make
laws. Courts, understandably
ofadministration,
are unfalseclaimsand aboutseriousdifficulties
willingto grantexemptionswhenevera sincerereligiousclaim of
is offered.The Court's approachin Lee to
substantialinterference
too
interest
is
butjudicialhesitancyto invalidate
relaxed,
compelling
in
exercise
of
statutes
free
cases is well grounded.The
applications
as that
act does not importa compellinginteresttestas stringent
used forotherconstitutional
problems.129
What morecan be said aboutthestatute'stest?For anycompelmeansare more
linginteresttest,weightofinterestand alternative
linked
than
at
first
When
a courtfocuses
appears
closely
glance."3
on an importanthigh-levelinterest,
theissuecomes downto available means;when a courtfocuseson a more particularinteresta
law serves,the issue is the strengthof the interest."3
The ReligiousFreedom RestorationAct and its legislativehisinterestis to be evaluated"at
toryare clear thatthe government's
A
asks
whether
the margin." court
any compellinginterestis
servedby applyingthe law againstthe religiousclaimantand others who are similarlysituated.132
129It is relevantthatwhenotherwise
validlawsare claimedto interfere
withan individual's
freedomof expression,the Court has decided that a test less stringentthan compelling
interestshould be used. UnitedStatesv O'Brien,391 US 367 (1968).
130
See Berg (cited in note 84) at 40.
was "disciplinewithinthe army,"but it
'31Thus, one interestin Goldmanv Weinberger
was extremely
doubtfulthatcompleteuniformity
of absenceofheadgearindoorswas neceswas itselfcast as an interest,it was not compellingby
saryto achieve that.If uniformity
in headgearis necesitself.The crucialinquiryturnsout to be whethercompleteuniformity
saryforgenerallyuniformappearancein lightof the objectivesbehindgenerallyuniform
appearance.
132
See, e.g., Laycock (cited in note 33) at 148-49. This inquirycan also be understood
interestin havinga law be adeas one about less restrictive
means:will the government's
means)?
quatelyservedif it is not applied to sincerereligiousobjectors(a less restrictive
meanscomponenthasneverbeen firmly
ScottIdelemanhas observedthatthelessrestrictive
embeddedin freeexercisejurisprudence.
See Ideleman(citedin note 100) at 280. If courts
more seriouslyinvestigatethe government's
need to applylaws againstreligiousclaimants,
the statutorytest could become significantly
protective,even if governmentinterestsof
moderateforceare treatedas compelling.One important
is whether
avenueof investigation
some alternative
civilianserviceforconscientiousobjectors,maybe
burden,like alternative
See
placed upon religiousclaimants,so thatoverallburdensare not too disproportionate.
Choper (citedin note 36) at 680. Exemptionsforreligiousclaimantsalone do raiseserious
and
Compelled
Exemptions
equal protectionconcern;see GeoffreyR. Stone, Constitutionally
theFreeExerciseClause,27 Wm & MaryL Rev 985, 987-89 (1986). These can be mitigated
burdens.Indeed, the preferableapproach,whenfeasible,is to permitanyone
by alternative
to opt foran exemption,but at the cost of an alternativeburdenthatfewwould choose
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Many suggestionshave been offeredon the slipperyissue of
whatshouldmakean interestsufficiently
compellingforfreeexercise cases. Some proposalsare negative.A government
interestis
not compelling(1) simplybecause the governmentsays it is,"33
(3) iftheinterestinvolvesonlymodest
(2) iftheinterestis slight,134'
or
administrative
(4) if the government
expense
inconvenience,135
has not protectedthe interestin othercontexts,'36(5) if claimsof
harmare purelyspeculative."'Althoughtheseproposalsseem innocuous,some courtdecisionsare hard to square withthem."38
Can anythingmore positivebe said about compellinginterest
in freeexercisecases? As discussedearlier,the governmenthas a
violations.Thus, it
compellinginterestin avoidingconstitutional
induceothersto
need not grantan exemptionthatwould strongly
a
since
violate
such
inducements
the Establishpractice religion,
mentClause.139Exemptionsthatmanypeople would like to have
fornonreligiousreasons,as frompayingtaxes,140
presentthe douburdenson
ble problemof insincereclaimsand disproportionate
thosewho do not receivetheexemption.Courtsand scholarsagree
requiredwhen the inexemptionsshould not be constitutionally
claimsare great.141
centivesto advancespuriousself-interested
Scholarshave offeredsome,moregeneralpositiveformulations.
StephenPepper has put it thisway:142 "[I]s therea real, tangible
non-trivial
injury
(palpable,concrete,measurable)non-speculative,
unless theywere deeplyopposed to the standardrequirement.See Kent Greenawalt,ConflictsofLaw and Morality327-28 (1987).
See Michael Stokes Paulsen,A RFRA Runs ThroughIt: ReligiousFreedomand the US
"33
Code,56 Mont L Rev 249, 254 (1995).
134See Laycock and Thomas (cited in note 57) at 222-25.
135 See Paulsen (cited in note 133) at 255.
136See Laycockand Thomas (citedin note 57) at 224, drawingfromChurch
oftheLukumi
BabaluAye.
137See Berg (cited in note 84) at 34.
does not havea comA morecontroversial
'38
negativesuggestionis thatthegovernment
pellinginterestin protectingadultsfromthe consequencesof theirown religiousbeliefs
and practices.See McConnell (citedin note 76) at 1145. The mosttroublingexamplesare
practicesthatinvolvehighlydangerousacts or even voluntarysubmissionto death.In the
can
near future,courtsneitherwill nor should endorsethe principlethatthe government
neverprotectpeople fromgraveharmsthatresultfromtheirreligiouschoices.
"3 See Berg (cited in note 84) at 45.
140See generallyStone (cited in note 132).
141
See, e.g., Laycock (cited in note 33) at 149; Berg (note 84) at 41-43.
142This testwas
suggestedpriorto the new act.
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to a legitimate,substantialstate interest."143Michael McConnell
has proposeda moredecisivetest:thata law maybe validlyapplied
meansfor(a) protecting
theprivate
"onlyifit is theleastrestrictive
rightsof others,or (b) ensuringthatthe benefitsand burdensof
This formulation
public lifeare equitablyshared."'144
incorporates
a principlethatpreventingharmto people because of theirown
and it downgrades
interest,"14
religiouschoicesis nevera sufficient
publicintereststhatare not reducibleto privaterightsor equitable
sharing.We should expectthat the courtswill stickwith more
innocuous,vaguer language than this. What is criticalis that
judges bothrecognizethatthe freeexercisetestis sui generis,and
take"compellinginterest"and "least restrictive
means" as serious
hurdles.
III.

ESTABLISHMENT

CLAUSE PROSPECTS:

THE

SHARDS

OF LEMON

Clause are bothharderand
Prospectsforthe Establishment
easierto describethanprospectsfortheFree ExerciseClause. The
doctrinalcomponentsof EstablishmentClause litigationare now
more amorphous,but in certaindomainsthe resultsmaybe more
predictable.14
A. CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES

AND OTHER COURTS

As the introductory
sectionindicates,Lemonhas ceased to operate as a generalEstablishmentClause test.No sittingJusticehas
been committedover time to that test. ChiefJusticeRehnquist
and JusticeScalia have regularlyattackedit and the separationist
resultsit has yielded."14
JusticeThomas has now placed himself
in
their
squarely
camp.'48JusticeStevens,at the otherend of the
on Re143StephenL. Pepper, The Conundrum
oftheFreeExerciseClause-Some Reflections
centCases,9 N Ky L Rev 265, 289 (1982). This formulation
may be seen as the otherside
of the negativestandardsforwhat does not countas a compellinginterest.
144
FIRST THINGS 30, 34 (May 1990).
Michael W. McConnell, TakingReligionSeriously,
145See note 138.
146Carl H. Esbeck providesan excellentview of how much is stable about adjudication
underthe ReligionClauses,A Restatement
oftheSupremeCourt'sLaw ofReligiousFreedom:
or Chaos,70 Notre Dame L Rev 581 (1995).
Coherence,
Conflict,
472 US 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist,J, dissenting);Lee
147 See, e.g., Wallacev Jaffree,
v Weisman,505 US 577, 631-46 (1992) (Scalia, J, dissenting,joined by Rehnquist,J).
id.
148See, e.g., Lee v Weisman,
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has suggestedthattheLemontestdoes not separategovspectrum,
ernmentfromreligionenough.149
JusticeKennedyhas favoredan
focuses
on
that
JusticeSouter'sviews
mainly coercion."50
approach
fitcomfortably
withLemon,and he has regretted
thelackofrespect
forprecedent;"15
but he has offeredno fulldefenseof Lemon.Justice O'Connor's emphasison endorsementmaybe understoodas
eitheran interpretation
or an alternative
to the "purpose"and "efShe once followedthe test,but with
fect" strandsof the test.152
doubtsabout its cogency.'53
JoinedbyJusticesSouterand Breyer
in the last term,she has more recentlyassertedthatthe timehas
come to drop Lemonas a comprehensive
test.In the presentcircumstances,no sensibleJusticewould endeavorto insiston the
traditionalversionof Lemon,ratherthanfocusingmore narrowly
on particularfactors.
Wheredoesthisleaveus?Asfarasimmediate
resultsareconcerned,
it leavesus withthejudgmentsofJusticesO'Connor and Kennedy.
it willbe
If thesetwoJusticesagreethata practiceis constitutional,
will
be
joined by Rehnquist,Scalia, and
upheld (because they
If
Thomas). eitherofthemcan be persuadedthattheEstablishment
Clause has been violated,thepracticewillveryprobablynot be upheld. (Conceivably,JusticeSouter,Ginsburg,or Breyerwill prove
on someissue.)JusticeKennedyhas emphasized
less "separationist"
in Lee v Weisman'54
thatevencoercionthat
"coercion,"determining
is indirectand lessthangravemaybe impermissible.
JusticeO'Confour
otherJustices
norhas oftenfocusedon endorsement.
Although
elements
of
with
that
the
coercive
school-sponsored
Kennedy
agreed
inLee,a majority
prayersrenderedthemunconstitutional
graduation
ofJusticeshas neveragreedthatcoercionlies at the heartof most
Clauseviolations."55
The statusofJustice
O'Connor's
Establishment
149 See, e.g., Committee
forPublicEducationv Regan,444 US 646, 671 (1980) (dissenting
opinion).
150See, e.g.,Allegheny
Countyv ACLU, 492 US 573, 655-79 (1989) (Kennedyconcurring
in partand dissentingin part);Lee v Weisman,505 US at 577 (1992).
151 See Lee v Weisman,
id at 609-31 (Souter,J,concurring).
152
See Lynchv Donnelly,465 US 668, 687-94 (1984), in which she proposes possible
endorsementas being the crucialquestionunderLemon.
472 US 38, 68 (1985) (concurringopinion).
153See Wallacev Jaffree,
505
US
577
(1992).
154
155ChiefJusticeRehnquistand JusticeScalia, however,joinedJusticeKennedy'sseparate
opinionin Allegheny
Countyv ACLU, 492 US 573, 655-79 (1989); and the fourdissenters
in Lee v Weismantook possiblecoercionas theirfocus,505 US at 632.
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A majorityofJusticesdo agree
endorsementapproachis different.
that"endorsement"is thecrucialinquiryforcertainkindsofcases,
of thattestfor
but no majorityagrees on the properformulation
at leastsome of thesecases.JusticeO'Connor emphasizestherelevance of endorsementin other settingsfor which mostJustices
assignit less importance.
How shouldotheractorsin the legal systemrespondto thismorass?Federal and statecourtsfacean uncommonproblemof legal
etiquette.Most Justiceshave now disavoweda previouslyprevailcastit aside in favor
ing test,butno majorityopinionhas explicitly
of any alternative.Should judges continueto behave as if Lemon
is in place? Prior to the end of the 1994 term,this seemed an
appropriatestance,whateveradditionalanalysisthe judges might
also have employed;but now thatLemonlacks any defenderson
the Court, other judges would performa shallow exercisewere
theyto continueto applyits terms.They should recognizethat
the SupremeCourt has definitely
abandonedLemon.
What courtsand lawyersshoulddo insteadis focuson narrower
principlesrelevantfor particularcircumstances,drawingthese
principlespartlyfromtheverySupremeCourt cases decidedunder
the Lemontest.The end of Lemonas such does not eliminatetheir
as precedents,thoughit mayshakethe foundationsof
significance
some of them.The Court's decidedlymixed signalsleave other
judges a greaterfreedomthanusual to relyon principlestheybelieve are sound; thosewho expectreviewand wantto be affirmed
will attendcloselyto JusticesO'Connor and Kennedy.'56
B. THE SHARDS OF LEMON

For twentyyears,most establishment
cases were decidedunder
Lemon has now been
the threefoldtest of Lemonv Kurtzman.157
"56Lawyerswill need to be as aware as theycan be of how the relevantcourtsare likely
whenlawyersare notyetawarewhichjudges
to respond."Awareness"is extremely
difficult
of a multi-member
courtwill be assigned.
all establishment
issues.
157 403 US 602 (1970). Applicationof the testdid not determine
As I have said, the Court once explicitlyrefrainedfromusing the standard,sayingthat
legislaturesmightpay chaplainsbecause the practiceenjoyedlong historicalacceptance.
463 US 783 (1983). Otherissuestouchingboth freeexerciseand estabMarshv Chambers,
lishmentwere resolvedprimarily
on otherbases. The Court has regardedlegislativeclassificationsthatfavorsome religionsover othersor discriminate
againstreligiouspracticesas
withthe statebearinga heavyburdento showa compelling
unconstitutional,
presumptively
interest.See Larsonv Valente,456 US 228 (1982) (alsodeclaringlaw invalidunderLemon);
ChurchoftheLukumiBabaluAyev CityofHialeah, 113 S Ct 2217 (1993). Disputes within
churchorganizationswerea majorarea in whichthe Court employedprinciplesotherthan
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does thatmake?The answerdepends
abandoned.What difference
on how farthe perceivedinfelicities
of Lemonconcernedwrongness ratherthanindecisiveness.'58
One methodof anticipating
our Establishment
Clause futureis
to examinethe statusof each of the threeaspectsof Lemon.On
it turnsout thateach of theseis actuallyacceptedin
examination,
in whattheyregard
some formbyeveryJustice;butthe differences
are striking.
as unconstitutional
AllJusticesagreethatsome connectionsof gov1. Entanglement.
The rule
ernmentand religiousorganizationsare unconstitutional.
that courtscannot decide questionsof religiousdoctrinecan be
So also can
understoodas avoidanceof one kindof entanglement.
the unchallengedprinciplethatgovernmentconstitutionally
cannot delegateto religiousorganizations
the powerto makelaws for
the generalpublic.159
Disagreementis over the kindsof "entanglements"that have
been the basis forthe Court's invalidationof laws. The Court's
In the
concernhas beenwithadministrative
entanglement.
primary
funds
do
pursuitof properobjectives,such as seeing thatpublic
not advancereligiousobjectivesofparochialschools,stateauthorities mayhave to monitorthe activitiesof religiousorganizations.
The Court has held thatwhen thisoversightbecomestoo great,
the Establishment
Clause is violated.'60The Court has regardeda
secondformofentanglement,
as important
"politicaldivisiveness,"
in some instances.The concernhere is that some issues,if left
to the politicalprocess,will generatebitterreligiousdivisions.161
Allowinglegislaturesto decidehow muchmoneyis to go to parochial schools would be divisivein this way; thus, such funding
poses thissecond formof entanglement.
those of Lemon,declaringthat courtscannot resolvemattersof religiousdoctrine,e.g.,
Churchv MaryElizabethBlue Hull MemorialPresbyterian
Church,393 US 440
Presbyterian
it was the testfora
(1969). Despite these pocketsforwhichLemonwas not determining,
wide rangeof establishment
issues.
of "multipart
teststhatcould be manipulatedto reach
'58Michael McConnell has written
to the
almostany result,"McConnell,Accommodation
ofReligion:An Updateand a Response
60 Geo Wash L Rev 685 (1992); JohnMansfieldearliercomplainedof the "incantaCritics,
value."JohnH. Mansfield,TheReligionClauses
tionofverbalformulaedevoidof explanatory
and thePhilosophy
72 CalifL Rev 846, 847 (1984).
oftheFirstAmendment
oftheConstitution,
159
v
Larkin
Grendel's
459
116
See, e.g.,
Den,
US
(1982); Esbeck (cited in note 146) at
605.
160E.g., Aguilarv Felton,473 US 402 (1985).
161
E.g., Lemonv Kurtzman,403 US 602, 622-24 (1971).
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is different
fromclose administrative
Politicaldivisiveness
superbanner
of "entanglement"is an
and
their
union
under
the
vision,
accidentof history.An issue can be highlydivisivewithoutinvolvand divisiveness
need not accoming administrative
entanglement,
administrative
Political
divisiveness
has never
entanglement.
pany
and
some
have
objectedto the
Justices
figuredveryprominently,
idea thatpeople can makepracticesunconstitutional
byraisingpoThe Court has said thata potential
liticaloppositionto them.162
forpoliticaldivisiveness
is not, standingalone, a basis forholding
a law invalid.163
AlthoughJusticeswill be influencedby apprehensions overthiskindof divisiveness,
and it standsas a generalreason
on establishments,
forrestrictions
whetherparticular
risksof political divisivenessshould be an explicitjustification
forinvalidating
governmentaction is at least doubtful.
is muchmoreimportant.
Some adAdministrative
entanglement
ministrative
are so close that theyshould cerinterrelationships
and all theJusticeswould probably
tainlybe heldunconstitutional,
findthemso (thoughsome mightbase invalidity
on a grounddifferentfromentanglement).164
Justiceswho hesitate
Interestingly,
to strikedown a practicebecause of undue entanglement
have octhe
lack
offered
as
a
casionally
ofentanglement groundwhya practice is constitutionally
acceptable.One reasonthe Court sustained
tax exemptionsforchurcheswas thattheyinvolvedless entanglement than would taxes;165
and in Rosenberger
the majoritynoted
thatenforcingof a guidelinethatforbadefundingof religiousactivitieswouldinvolvemoreentanglement
thanifreligiousactivities
were treatedlike otheractivities.166
The high-watermarkof invalidationon entanglement
grounds
involvedmonitoring
ofpublicfundsto be used forparochialschool
education.The Court treatedoversightnecessaryto avoid an impermissibleeffectas undue entanglement,and dissenterscom-

465 US 668, 689 (1984) (concurringopinionof O'Connor, J).
162E.g., Lynchv Donnelly,
465 US 668, 683-84 (1984).
163
Lynchv Donnelly,
164Three Justiceshave expressedtheirdissatisfaction
with the entanglementprong of
Lemonv Kurtzman,
403 at 661-71 (1971) (White,Dissenting),and Roemer
v MarylandPublic
WordsBd., 426 US 736, 768-76 (1976); Aguilarv Felton,473 at 430 (1985) (O'Connor,
dissenting,joined by Rhenquist).
397 US 664 (1970).
165Walz v Tax Commission,
v Rectorand Visitors
166Rosenberger
ofthe University
of Virginia,115 S Ct at 2465.
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ofthesecases,
plainedofa "Catch 22."'67 In themostcontroversial
in
v
the
Court
held
invalid
a
program whichordiAguilar Felton,'68
did
remedial
school
personnel
narypublic
teachingwithinparochial school classroomsthatlacked religioussymbols.When the
Court subsequentlyheld invalida law adopted to meet problems
thatdecisiongenerated,169
fourJusticesindicatedthatAguilarhad
been wronglydecided,and another,JusticeKennedy,said it "may
have been erroneous."'17
Althoughmost membersof the Court
continue to regard administrativeentanglementas a possible
source of invalidity,
the combinationof Justiceswho would not
decide cases directlyin termsof "entanglement,"
plus thosewho
in
more
wouldallow
latitude administrative
thando earsupervision
will be allowed
lier decisions,is a majority.Greaterentanglement
thanin the past;"17
thatis, it will takemore to make entanglement
excessivethanwhenAguilarwas decided.
2. Purpose.Recent cases shed littlelighton the fateof Lemon's
firststrand,therequirement
of secularpurpose.Partlybecausethe
even
Court has resolvedthata significant
secularpurposesuffices,
ifjoined withan importantreligionpurpose,thatrequirement
has
fewcases in which
lackeda majorimpact.In mostof the relatively
the courthas been unable to finda secularpurpose,an impermissible religiouseffectwould have condemnedthe practicein any
event.172
We can identifyone straightforward
disagreementand three
out
of
the
secular
complexproblemsarising
purposerequirement.
The disagreement
is over evidenceof motivationnot to be found
in a statute'stext.EveryJusticeseemsto agree thata purposean167

J).

E.g., Aguilarv Felton,473 US 402, 420-21 (1985) (dissentingopinion of Rehnquist,

473 US 402 (1985). See, e.g., Glendon and Yanes (citedin note 76) at 514; Douglas
168
and Disaggregated
TowardReligion,
39 DePaul L Rev
Laycock,Formal,Substantive,
Neutrality
993, 1007-08 (1990).
169
In Bd ofEd ofKiryas
Joel VillageSchoolDist. v Grumet,114 S Ct 2481 (1994), the Court
struckdown New York's creationof a special school districtfora community
of religious
Jews.
170Id at 2505 (concurring
opinion).
487 US 589 (1988), alreadyrepresenteda significant
relaxation.
17I Bowenv Kendrick,
172 In Wallacev Jaffree,
472 US 38 (1985), theCourtdid hold "momentof silence"legislation invalidbecause of a religiouspurpose,althougha majorityof theJusticesindicated
thattheywould sustainotherstatutesprovidingformomentsof silence in public school.
Id at 62 (concurringopinion of Powell,J); 67 (concurringopinion of O'Connor, J); and
83-113 (threedissenting
Justices).
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nouncedin a preambleto promoteacceptanceof a particularreligion would rendera law invalid(whetheror not a parallelsecular
purposecould be discerned)."'Most Justicessuppose thatcourts
shouldexaminelegislativehistoryto ascertainwhethera dominant
JusticeScalia woulddisregardevidence
purposeis impermissible.'74
of the subjectivemotivationof legislators.175
A relateddifference
is thatmostJusticeshave engagedin a seriousinquirywhethera
purportednonreligiouspurposeis credible;JusticeScalia would be
much more acceptingof claimedsecularpurposes.176'
What connectionsbetweenreligiousunderstanding
and legislativeobjectivesshifta purposefromthepermissiblesecularcategory
to theimpermissible
religiousone? One crucialissueconcernslegislationthatdoes not directlyaid or promotea religionbut makes
no senseapartfroma religiousfoundation.
In Bowersv Hardwick,177
which upheld legislationbanning homosexual behavior among
adults,the Court consideredit irrelevantthatthe primaryobjection to such behaviorwas based on religiousgrounds.The Court
determinedthat religious beliefs could appropriatelyunderlie
moral judgmentson which legal prohibitionsare founded.Four
dissenters,
invokingin passingthe purposestrandof Lemon,""arthat
an underlying
such
motivationwas not adequate to susgued
tain the law.
On the other hand, in Edwardsv Aguillard,179the Court held
thata law requiringanyschool thatteachesevolutionalso to teach
creationismwas invalidbecause of its religiouspurpose.Justice
Scalia stronglyobjected;he viewedthe law as merelyanotherinstance in whichreligiousmotivationmighthave produceda law
Some remarksChiefJusticeRehnquistmade in Wallacev Jaffree,
472 US 108-09, may
"73
suggesthe thinksno purpose requirementmakes sense; but I stronglydoubt he would
accept an explicitaim to promotea particularreligion.

472 US 38 (1985), the Court reliedbothon a comparisonof the
174In Wallacev Jaffree,
statutewithits predecessorand on the words of legislativesponsors.
E.g., Edwardsv Aguillard,482 US 578, 636-40 (1987) (dissentingopinion of Scalia,
175
J).This positionfitswithScalia's generalattackon judicialrelianceon subjectivemotivation
and on legislativehistory.
176See id.
177

478 US 186 (1986).

178Id at 211. The dissenterscited Stonev Graham,449 US 39 (1980), whichrelied on

an impermissiblepurpose to hold invalida postingof the Ten Commandmentsin the
classroomsof a public school.
179
Edwardsv Aguillard,482 US 578 (1987).

366

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[1995

thatimposesa nonreligiousrequirement-thatschoolsteachalternativescientifictheories.Without quite puttingit this way, the
Court doubted that "creation science" is science. The Court's
mainemphasiswas thatonlyreligiousbeliefproducesbeliefin creation science and rejectionof evolution,and thatthe teachingof
creationscience is the indirectteachingof a religiouspoint of
The aim to promotesuch teachingand countertheteachview."18
ing of evolutionwas thus a religiouspurpose.
If one looks at the resultsin Bowersand Edwards,one might
conclude that science-teachingrequirementsbased on religious
purpose,but thatlegal prohijudgmentsreston an impermissible
bitionsmayreston moraljudgmentsthatrestin turnon religious
judgments.How can we explainthis?Perhaps by a fundamental
difference
betweenscienceand moralityin our culture.When factualclaimsfallwithintherealmofscience,and theironlyplausible
basis is religious,teachingthe claimedfactsas true,or as plausible
seemsto be a teachingoftheunderlying
reliscientific
hypotheses,
moral
not
science.
When
based
judgmentssquarely
gious grounds,
on religiousbeliefsare used as the basis forcriminalenforcement
it being
and moralteaching,theunderstanding
maybe different,'8'
assumedthatmoralityis much less easy to disentanglefromreligion thanis science,and thatwe lack agreednonreligiousmethods
forresolvingmoral questions.
The tworemainingmajorproblemsaboutpurposeconcernboth
thatstrandof Lemonand the practicallymore importantrequirementthata law not have a primaryeffectof promotingreligion.
One problem,permissibleaccommodationsto religiousexercise,
is partlyterminological
and partlysubstantive.
Typicalexamplesof
accommodationsare legislationpermitting
membersof theNative
AmericanChurchto use peyotein worshipservicesand allowing
JusticeBrennanalso suggestedthatcreationscience,withits claim that God created
s8o
humanbeingswithoutany processof evolutionfromotheranimals,is directlya religious
doctrine.When "creationscience" is reformulated
as a theoryof nonevolutionary
generation,in a mannerthatdoes not explicitlyintroduceGod, it may no longerbe explicitly
religious;but most of the Court's basis forits conclusionwould remain.
It is not clearwhatJusticeScalia would have thoughtifhe had agreedthatat thatstage
of the litigation-beforedefendersof the law had had a chance to presentevidenceof a
scientificbasis forcreationscience-the Court should have concludedthatonly religious
beliefcould supportbeliefin creationscience.
Is' My own view is thatinsofaras the religiousjudgmentproducesa beliefthatbehavior
is simplywrongful,
apartfromsecularharms,thepurposeshouldbe regardedas impermissible. Kent Greenawalt,ReligiousConvictions
and PoliticalChoice247-49 (1988).
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the Amishto withdrawchildrenfromschool at an earlyage. All
Justicesagree thatsome legislationof this sortis appropriate.
The terminological
criticismof Lemonwas thataccommodation
legislationdemonstratesthat religiouspurposes and effectsare
sometimessalutary;therefore,
requirementsof a secularpurpose
and no primaryreligiouseffectare misconceived.The responseto
this criticismtook one of two forms:eitherpermissiblereligious
accommodationis a secularpurposeand effect,
or the needed pureffect
Lemon
be
more
and
under
should
pose
preciselyunderstood
The second
as secular or acceptablereligiousaccommodation.182
is
more
because religiousaccommodaresponse
straightforward,
tion is not a typicalsecularpurpose.With the demise of Lemon,
the Court can simplysay thata law thatworksan appropriateaccommodationis permissible,withouthavingto "explain" either
thataccommodationis not a purposeand primaryeffectthatadvancesreligionor thatsome purposesand primaryeffectsthatadvance religionare reallyall right.
The terminologicalconfusionabout accommodation,although
it has contributed
to undermining
theLemontest,has been shadow
for
those
who
what
was at stake.Howeverawkunderstood
boxing
ward the termsof Lemon,Justiceswho adheredto the testnever
supposedit barredall permissibleaccommodationto religiousexercise. The criticismof Lemonthat connectsto the substantive
problemabout accommodationis thatthe test providedno help
forcourtsdrawingthe line betweenpermissibleaccommodations
and unacceptablepurposesand effects.Rather,it createdonly an
illusion of a genuinestandardof decision.The accuracyof this
criticismcan best be gauged afterone directlyfaces the crucial
substantiveissue of how to distinguishpermissibleaccommodationsfromimpermissible
of religion,underthe Esadvancements
tablishmentand Free Exercise Clauses. I discuss that issue in a
finalpartof the article.
The second generalproblemthatembracespurposeand effect
concernswhat amountsto an unacceptableendorsement,an in182
In Corporation
Bishopv Amos,JusticeWhite's majorityopinioncharacterizes
ofPresiding
a purposeto accommodateas secular,483 US 327, 335 (1987); JusticeO'Connor, concurof the purposetest,id at 2874. JonathanE. Nuechterlein,
ring,proposesa reformulation
The Free ExerciseBoundaries
Accommodation
undertheEstablishment
Clause,99
ofPermissible
Yale L J 1127 (1990), suggestsa distinctionbetweensecularrespectforreligiousscruples,
and advancingreligionforreligiousreasons.
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quirythatalso survivesinto the post Lemonera. I shall also put
thatquestionaside forthe moment.
3. Effectofadvancingreligion.
The prongof Lemonthatyielded
the most invalidations
was the requirementthata law or practice
not have a primaryeffectof advancingor inhibitingreligion.The
futureof EstablishmentClause jurisprudencewill depend largely
on what kinds of effectsare judged to be impermissible.The
Court's decisionsin the 1994 termindicatesignificantareas of
Beforeexaminingthese,I mention
continuityand discontinuity.
some otherproblemsabout impermissible
effect.
One probleminvolvesthe inhibitionof religion.No Supreme
Court decisionhas actuallyreliedon the theorythata law inhibClause, but stateitingreligionis a violationof the Establishment
mentsof the Lemontestwere evenhanded:a law maynot advance
does not conor inhibitreligionas a primaryeffect.The difficulty
cern inhibitionof one or a few religions,which rightlymay be
viewed as establishingalternativereligions.But suppose religion
in generalwere inhibited.Would a law favoringatheism,agnostiof relicism,or secularismbe a law "respectingan establishment
gion"? Some have thoughtnot, arguingthatsuch a law, rather,
in a loose
wouldviolatetheFree ExerciseClause by "prohibiting,"
free
exercise
of
the
sense,
religion."83
For tworeasonsthisconceptualquandaryhas neverseemedvery
important.First,everyonehas assumed eitherthat the Religion
Clauses togetherrequireequal treatmentof religiousand atheist
or antireligious
positions(the prevailingSupremeCourt approach
formostissues)or thatreligiouspositionscan be favored(the approach of some Justicesand criticsof the Court). Almostno one
be favored.Thus,
has arguedthatatheistpositionsmaypermissibly
Clause
whetheran inhibitionofreligionoffendstheEstablishment
"4
in
the
United
little
bite.
has had
Second, legislatures
practical
Statesdo not adoptlawsthatare designedto inhibitreligion.Some
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock,Towardsa GeneralTheoryoftheReligionClause:The Case
81 Colum L Rev 1373, 1378and theRightto ChurchAutonomy,
ofChurchLaborRelations
85 (1981). Such an inhibitionmightviolatenot onlythe Free ExerciseClause but also the
the Free Speech Clause. See
Equal ProtectionClause, and, if it involvedcommunication,
in Constitutional
also Kent Greenawalt,Religionas a Concept
Law, 72 Calif L Rev 753, 754,
n 52 (1984).
184But see Douglas Laycock,A SurveyofReligious
Libertyin the UnitedStates,47 Ohio
Clause
St L J 409, 450 (1986), pointingand thatmorepeople can sue if the Establishment
is violated.
183
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opinion may supportthe view that
language in the Rosenberger
in
avoidingreligiousteaching the publicschoolsis, indeed,as critics of the Court's bible readingand prayerdecisionshave long
claimed,a kindofinhibitionofreligion.The Courttreatsthe state
choicenotto fundpublicationsdevotedto makingreliuniversity's
claims
as a formof viewpoint
(a ratherimgious
discrimination"8s
conclusion
since
and
atheist
claimswere
plausible
positivereligious
treatedequally6"').If the university
was guiltyof viewpointdisit is not muchof an extensionto saythatthe supprescrimination,
sion of religiousteachingin publicschoolsis a formof viewpoint
one that inhibitsreligion.The consequences of
discrimination,
such a judgmentremainto be seen; but the possibilitythat the
Court mightso characterizethe absence of religiousteachingin
publicschoolssuggeststhatit could deemmorelaws(and constitutional principles)to "inhibitreligion" than has previouslybeen
thought.In any event,repetitionsin the Lemonformulado not
settle that laws inhibitingreligion violate the Establishment
Clause. That issuehas neverbeen directlypresented,and theabandonmentof Lemonremovesthe formulathatmayhave made coverage by the Clause appear a stable constitutional
principle.
A secondproblemconcernsthe relationship
betweenpotentially
Unimpermissible
religiouseffectsand appropriateseculareffects.
der Lemon,the Court effectively
resolvedthat a substantialrelieffect
of
the
kind
a law invalid,evenifa securenders
gious
wrong
lar effectis ofequal or greatermagnitude.187
One wouldnot expect
the Court explicitly
to turnaroundon this.Even ifthe Court sustains some measuresthatwere held invalidunderLemon,it will
probablydo so on the groundthatthe challengedeffectsare permissible,or slightand speculative,ratherthanbecause seculareffectsare more substantialthan substantialand potentiallyunconstitutionalreligiouseffects.
The thirdproblemconcernsaccommodationof religiousexercise,whichI treatin greaterdepthafterconsideringthetwomajor
establishment
cases of the 1994 term.
v Rectorand Visitors
ofthe University
of Virginia,115 S Ct 2510, 2516-20
"85Rosenberger
(1995).
'86The conclusionwasplausibleinsofaras publicationscould discusspracticalsocial problemsfromperspectives
otherthanreligiousand antireligious
ones. My analysisofthisaspect
of the opinion is in ViewpointsfromOlympus,to be publishedin a Springissue of the
Columbia Law Review.
187 See, e.g., GrandRapidsSchoolDistrict
v Ball, 473 US 373, 381-83 (1985).
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C. CAPITOL SQUARE AND ENDORSEMENT

Each of the cases at the end of the 1994 termrevealssomething
Clause litigation.
about futureEstablishment
of broad significance
and the place of endorseI firstaddressthe CapitolSquarecase,188
ment analysisfor symbolicspeech in public places and more
broadly.
case in whicha govCapitolSquareis not a typicalestablishment
ernmentconnectionto religiousspeech is claimed to amountto
access
violation.Rather,the board administering
a constitutional
that
it
to public propertyadjacent to the state capitol argued
should be able to excludereligiousspeech,a large cross,because
This twist
allowingthe cross would constitutean establishment.
of the case. Its use of endorsement
does not affectthe significance
But theJusticesfail
a vitalthreadof continuity.
analysisrepresents
in which
to build stable principleseven for those circumstances
endorsementis the crucialinquiry.The naggingquestionscan be
as the
summedup as: (1) How manyJusticessupportendorsement
count?and
crucialinquiry?(2) Whose perceptionsof endorsement
(3) What degree of endorsementis unconstitutional?
thanits answer.How
The firstquestionis morestraightforward
an
about
now
believe
that
perceivedendorseinquiry
manyJustices
mentis centralforcases of public symbolicspeech and forother
cases? We know fromCapitolSquare that fourJusticesdid not
so long as the
thinkpossibleperceptionsofendorsement
mattered,
in
a
treated
neutral,evenhanded
private"speakers"
government
Five Justicesconsideredendorsementin someformto be
way.189
critical.JusticeScalia's opinionforthe fourJusticesdistinguished
governmentallowance of privatespeech in a public forumfrom
itself.Thus, a readingof Capisymbolicspeechbythe government
tolSquare suggeststhatall Justicesagree thatendorsementis the
properinquiryif the governmentitselferectsa creche,cross,or
menorahon its property.That may be deceptive.Three of the
endorsefourJusticeswho joined the Scalia opiniononce resisted
mentanalysiseven forthosecases.190They mayor maynot follow
Boardv Pinette,115 S Ct 2440 (1995).
8 CapitolSquareReviewand Advisory
" Id at 2447-50 (opinion of Scalia,J).
90See Allegheny
Countyv ACLU, 492 US 573, 655-67 (1989) (Kennedy,J, dissenting,
joined by Rehnquist,J, and Scalia, J). One would guess that if these three rejectedan
endorsementapproach,so also wouldJusticeThomas.
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testforcases of government
precedentand acceptan endorsement
O'Connor's
opinions have concentratedon enspeech. Justice
dorsementin a much broaderrangeof circumstances;
how much
in
it
those circumstancesis still unweightotherJusticesgive
certain.191
The centralsubstantivequestion, "whose perceptionsof endorsement?"has plagued the test fromits inception.Originally
a case involvproposingendorsementanalysisin Lynchv Donnelly,
a
secular
at
Christmas,
Justice
placed
among
ing creche
symbols
maintainedthatthe fundamental
O'Connor has consistently
concernis thatthe government
not send "a messageto nonadherents
thattheyare outsiders,not fullmembersof the politicalcommunity,and an accompanyingmessageto adherentsthattheyare inShouldthe
siders,favoredmembersofthepoliticalcommunity.""'92
about
endorsement
be
about
reaction
or objecsubjective
inquiry
tive evaluation?Should it focuson minoritiesor majorities?
Some problemswitha subjectivetestare obvious.193First,ifthe
testis to be appliedby courts,includingappellatecourts,how are
judges to ascertainpeople's reactions?Second, assumingthatthe
most sensitivepersonwill not determinethe outcome,what percentageof "endorsement"reactionswould be constitutionally
significant?Third, are reactionsof people in individuallocalitiesor
people more generallyto control?194Fourth,once one recognizes
that most Jews might react differently
to a creche frommost
Christians,do the reactionsof membersof the minoritiescount
more than the reactionsof membersof the majority?
With thesedifficulties,
JusticeO'Connor's optingforan objective approach,one that asks how a reasonablepersonwould respond, is hardlysurprising.A reasonable-personapproach does
191
A numberof majorityopinionshave treatedendorsementas a relevantfactor.E.g.,
GrandRapidsSchoolDist. v Ball, 473 US 373, 389 (1985).
192
465 US 668, 688 (1984) (concurring
opinion).Amongscholarswho havebeen supportive ofJusticeO'Connor's approachare Donald L. Beschle,The Conservative
as Liberal:The
and theApproach
ReligionClauses,LiberalNeutrality,
ofJusticeO'Connor,62 Notre Dame L
Rev 151 (1987); ArnoldH. Loewy,Rethinking
Government
TowardsReligionUnder
Neutrality
theEstablishment
Clause:The UntappedPotentialofJusticeO'Connor'sInsight,64 NC L Rev
1049 (1986).
193
and DoctrinalIllusions:Establishment
See, e.g., Steven D. Smith,Symbols,
Perceptions,
and the "No Endorsement"
Test,86 Mich L Rev 266, 291-92 (1987).
Neutrality
194 the focuswere on individual
If
communities,common sense would suggestthatthe
matterwould be one of fact,withverylimitedappellatereview.
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not itselfeliminatethe minority-majority
worry-one can certhat
a
reasonable
from
Jew
tainlyimagine
mightreactdifferently
a reasonable Christian-but JusticeO'Connor has conceived a
standardthatis not just some weightedsum of
reasonable-person
reasonable membersof minoritiesand majorities.The overall
trendin her opinionshas been to pack more awarenessof relevant factorsinto the reasonableperson.In Wallacev Jaffree
(the
moment-of-silence
case), she asked how the law would be perceivedby "an objectiveobserveracquaintedwiththe text,legislaof the statute,"'95and wenton to
tivehistory,and implementation
that
the
observer
"is
objective
acquaintedwiththe Free Exersay
cise Clause and the values it promotes.""96In CapitolSquare,she
said that"thereasonableobserverin theendorsement
inquirymust
and
be deemedawareof thehistoryand contextof thecommunity
forumin whichthe religiousdisplayappears.""97
JusticeO'Connor sets her positionagainstone thatwould render religiousspeech invalidifsomeactualindividualsor somereasonableindividualsmightperceivean endorsement.She does not,
however,squarelyface an evidentimplicationof her approach.
Most people who pass by a centrally
locatedpublicspace in a large
be
aware
will
not
of
the
historyof the community
cityprobably
and forumto the degree O'Connor assumes for her reasonable
person. Thus, it is entirelypossible thatmostactualpeople,even
most people who would be reasonable in everyother respect,
mightperceivean endorsementwhenJusticeO'Connor's reasonable person,aware thatthe square is open equally to all private
displays,would not. O'Connor's approach,joined byJusticesSouter and Breyer,is defensible;but it is at some removefromthe
questionwhethermanyreal people will feelexcludedbecause they
perceivegovernmentsupportof a religionthatis not theirs.198
JusticeStevensalso asks about the standpointof a "reasonable
observer"in CapitolSquare,but he says,"It is especiallyimportant
to take account of the perspectiveof a reasonableobserverwho
's 472 US 38, 76 (1985).
Id at 83.
196
'19115 S Ct at 2455.
William P. Marshall has argued thatwhetherpeople feel offendedshould not be a
198
andFreeExercise
inEstablishment
standardforestablishment
cases,TheConcept
ofOffensiveness
66 Ind L J 351 (1991).
Jurisprudence,
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may not share the particularreligious belief [a symbol] exHe rejectsthe idea thatthe reasonablepersonneed be
presses."199
thatpreviawareof all thehistoryoftheforum,and assertsfurther
ous displayson the capitolsquare,such as a United Way display,
did reflecta kindof endorsement.His overallperspectiveis indicated by his commentthat "when a statue or some other free
of
standing,silent,unattended,immoveablestructure-regardless
its particularmessage-appears on the lawn of the Capitol building, the reasonableobservermustidentifythe State eitheras the
messenger,or, at the very least, as one who has endorsed the
message."200

JusticeGinsburg'sbriefopinionsuggeststhatwithouta plainly
did not enthe publicthatthe government
visiblesign informing
was unacdorse the messageof the Klan's cross,the government
ceptablycoupled withreligion.Citingwitha "cf." an articlethat
is absolutistin its rejectionof religioussymbolson government
JusticeGinsburgdoes not indicatejust how she will
property,201
approach inquiriesabout endorsement.Whethera majoritywill
settleon a singleapproachto endorsementis unclear,butJustice
O'Connor's approachis situatedin themiddle.202
For the timebein whichmost
will
for
her
determine
results
cases
approach
ing,
as
Justicestake endorsement the centralinquiry.
No approachto endorsementis withoutseriousdifficulties,
but
I believeJusticeO'Connor's formulationin CapitolSquare takes
In makingthis
the testtoo farfromits underlying
justification.203
I distinguisheffectsin publicsymbolicspeech cases like
criticism,
and
CapitolSquare, in which the test arose and has been
Lynch
most securelyrooted,fromsome other possible inquiriesabout
endorsement.
In Wallacev Jaffree,204
mostofthepublicwouldhave
199
Id at 2466. See also Norman Dorsen, TheReligionClausesand Nonbelievers,
25 Wm &
Mary L Rev 863, 868 (1986).
200Id

at 2467.

59 U Chi L
Id at 2475, citingKathleenM. Sullivan,Religionand LiberalDemocracy,
Rev 195 (1992).
202More precisely,withJusticesSouter and Breyer,she representsa pluralitybetween
endorsementmore easily(Stevensand probablyGinsJusticeswho will findimpermissible
burg) and Justiceswho thinkendorsementis all rightor will be more hesitantto findit.
203See KennethL. Karst, The FirstAmendment,
thePoliticsofReligionand theSymbols
of
27 Harv CR-CL L Rev 503, 516 (1992).
Government,
204472 US 38
(1985).
201
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been unaware how the existingmoment-of-silence
statutecom-

offered
for
andwhatreasonsitssponsors
paredwithitspredecessor
change.Askingwhetherthe legislaturehas endorsedprayermay
be a methoda courtuses to understandthe legislature'saims. If

is a usefulconceptforthatendeavor,
endorsement
a highly
objecbe
tivestandardthatimputessubstantial
may approknowledge

not assess
priate;the Court wantsto developits own perspective,
how ordinarypeople respond.However,when a court considers
the effectof symbolicspeech on governmentproperty,people's
actualreactionsare ofprimary
The pointis to avoid
importance.205
of
and
of a subjecexclusion
dominance.206
The
difficulties
feelings
in termsof a reasonableperson
tiveinquirymakea testformulated

butthereasonable
personshouldhaveonlyan ordiappropriate,
amount
of
of
the
lawandofthehistory
ofsymbols
nary
knowledge
in publicplaces. Further,since feelingsof exclusionamongmembers of minoritiesare so important,
and sincethe majority(Chris-

dominance
so muchforgranted
thattheymay
tians)takecultural

not perceiveendorsement
of theirposition,207
judgesshouldattend
especiallyto how reasonablemembersofminorities
mayreact.For
cases in which actual reactionsare the vital concern,Justices

shouldnot imputeto "reasonablepeople"a knowledge
of legal
and politicalmatters
thatfarexceedsthatof ordinary
people.208

Yet another problem about endorsementremains: "What
amountsto endorsement?"This problemwas implicitwhen a meand it was exposedmore sharplyin
norahwas on publicproperty,

theNewYorkstatelegislature's
creation
ofa specialschooldistrict
so thata smallOrthodox
couldgetthebenefit
Jewishcommunity
of public educationfor handicappedchildren.209
No one would

of otherconnections
205
Probablythesame conclusionholdswhena courtaddresseseffects
of governmentto religion.
206StevenSmith(cited in note
193), at 306-09, doubtsthatendorsementties closelyto
the politicalstandingof citizens;but I agree withKennethKarst (note 203), at 518-19,
thatstatuswithinthe politicalcommunityin a broadersense is what matters.
207When I was a childand we gatheredarounda treein our publicschool to singChristmas carols,it did not occur to me that this was anythingother than natural.Compare
onMulticulturalism,
"Equal Concern
SandyLevinson'sreactionsin Levinson,SomeReflections
and Respect,"
and theEstablishment
27 U RichmondL Rev
ClauseoftheFirstAmendment,
989, 991 (1993).
20SI disagreewithJusticeO'Connor's conclusionsabout the absence of endorsementin
in the
both Lynchand CapitolSquare; but my criticismof her endorsementformulation
lattercase is not dependenton that.It is, of course,truethatimputinga lot of knowledge
to the observermay make a findingof no endorsementmore plausible.
209 BoardofEducation
ofKiryasJoel VillageSchoolDist. v Grumet,114 S Ct 2481 (1994).
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suppose that the state legislaturewas endorsingthis Orthodox
groupas havingtherightreligiousview,butone mightthinkit was
in thewayin whichmuchof
recognizingthe groupas meritorious
If thatmessageis consocietyrecognizestheAmishas meritorious.
veyedfairlystrongly,is thatendorsementor somethingless than
endorsement?There is, of course,a wide range of positivemessages thatmightbe conveyedby legislativechoice and perceived
by reasonableobservers;it is not simple to say which of these
amountto inappropriateendorsement.210
Perhaps the key should be comparative.If a minoritygroup is
implicitly
recognizedas havingsome particularmerit,but the legislatureis neitherembracingits positionnor clearlyholdingit up
as superiorto some othergroup,probablyno endorsementshould
be found.If, however,people would perceivethatthe groupwas
being labeled as superior,or closerto the truth,thansome other
even if
highlyrelevantgroup,thatshouldconstituteendorsement,
no one supposes the group's positionis being accepted as true.
Thus, forexample,it mightconstituteendorsementof Orthodox
ofmodernJewsin pubJudaismoverReformJudaismifportrayals
lic school textbooksconsistently
showedmen wearingyarmulkes.
D. ROSENBERGER AND PUBLIC FUNDING

The Rosenberger
case211is important
formanyreasons.It reveals
a good deal about how the Court will treatvariousprinciplesand
priorcases now thatit has abandonedLemon.JusticeKennedyimplicitlyadopts,and JusticeO'Connor explicitly
presents,an alternativeto adjudicationaccordingto tests.Finally,the decisionand
opinionsshakethe foundationsof whathas been the mostimportantarea of EstablishmentClause law-public aid to privatereligious schools. I set that prior law briefly,beforeexaminingthe
opinions.
The prevailingassumptionin cases involvingpublic financial
has been that
supportof religiousschools and otherinstitutions
cannot
and
other
supportreligiousteaching
government
religious
activities.This has meant most obviouslythat the government
210See Smith(cited in note 193) at 276-77.
211 Rosenberger
v Rectorand Visitors
of Virginia,115 S Ct 2510 (1995).
ofthe University

376

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[1995

cannot financereligiousworshipand religiousteachingin themselves.212
The rule against public paymentsfor religiousteachinghas
Suppose thatforeach studentreliprovedeven more restrictive.
gious schools annuallyprovide$3,000 of seculareducation.Some
scholarshave suggestedstatesoughtto be able to giveundifferenThe
tiatedgrantsof up to $3,000 per studentto theseschools.213
Court has decisivelyrejectedthat argumenton the groundthat
aid religiousfuncand impermissibly
suchmoneywould inevitably
tions of the school as well as secularones. Some cases have sustained assistanceto students,which the studentshave chosen to
but the balancehas been tippedby
spend at religiousinstitutions,
in prinJusticeswho have consideredsuchindirectaid as different
The
to
direct
direct
from
only
grants religiousschools
ciple
grants.
thathave been permittedhave been directedto secularfunctions
in a mannerthat does not also assistreligiousactivities.214Even
thisavenueof aid has been sharplylimitedby the Court's rule of
underwhichsupervisionto assurethat
no "undue entanglement,"
does
not
to
money
go
religiousteachingmust not involvetoo
much administrative
entanglement.
In Rosenberger,
the dissentersarguedthatgivingan equal financial benefitto a religiousactivitywas impermissiblebecause it
financed
would violate the EstablishmentClause. The university
publicationof variousstudentjournals,but it excludedactivities
a particularbelie[f]in
that"primarilypromot[ed]or manifest[ed]
or about a deityor an ultimatereality."By considerableingenuity,
the Court categorizedthe exclusionas viewpointdiscrimination.
The university
interposedthe EstablishmentClause as a compelthe publicationof religious(and antilinginterestin not financing
of
view.215
From at least one perspective,this
religious)points
the Court respondedthat
212When tax exemptionswere attackedas unconstitutional,
exemptionswerenot grantsand enjoyedlong historicalacceptance,Walz v Tax Commission,
397 US 664 (1970); it did not intimatethatgrantswiththe same economiceffectwould
be all right.
Clauseand Aid to ParochialSchools,56 S
21 See, e.g.,JesseH. Choper, The Establishment
Cal L Rev 260 (1968). See also Choper, SecuringReligiousLiberty174-88 (1995). Various
possibletheoriesabout aid are summarizedsuccinctlyin Laycock (note 184) at 443-46.
is paid forby someoneelse,moneyotherwise
214Of course,ifa necessarysecularfunction
necessaryforthatmay end up going to a religiousfunction.
beforetheSupremeCourt. 115 S Ct at 2520215However,it did not pressthisargument
21.
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seemed a stronger
would be involved
argumentthatestablishment
than has sufficedto defeatmost school aid-here the university
would be financingpublicationof evangelism,not some secular
activitythathappenedto be connectedto a religiousorganization.
JusticesKennedy and O'Connor mentionvarious factorsthat
differentiate
fundingof a studentreligiouspublicationfromtax
the
of
Wide AwakeProsupport
religiousactivitiesof churches.216
which
the
at
was
not itselfa reductions,
published journal issue,
ligious organization;the governmentprogramwould be neutral
towardreligionif publicationsof all kindswere funded;no endorsementwould be implied; fundingmoney is derivedfroma
studentfee,not generaltaxes;studentswitha conscientiousobjection to use of theirfeesforpoliticalor religiousmessages(unlike
ordinarytaxpayers)mighthave a constitutional
rightnot to pay;
directpaymentsgo to theprinter,
notto theorganizationsponsoring a publication.
Evaluationof Rosenberger
turnson the Court's conclusionabout
discrimination
and
on whetherthe factorsthat distinviewpoint
the
from
use of taxesto supportchurches
guish
Virginiaprogram
make a constitutional
difference.
The university's
exclusionis not
The Court
accuratelycharacterizedas viewpointdiscrimination.
more
have
reasoned
that
the
exclumight
persuasively
university's
not
should
be
sion, though
mainly viewpoint discrimination,
treatedas presumptively
unconstitutional
because it indirectly
disfavorsreligionand demands complex administrative
determinationsabout religion;but I believethatargumentalso shouldhave
failed.217
On the establishment
issue, each of the factorsby itself
is notverysignificant.
Whetherin combinationtheymakea crucial
constitutionaldifferenceis more debatable,thoughI findmore
persuasivethe dissenters'positionthat,despiteall the variations
fromuse of ordinarytaxesto supportreligiousactivities,
the funding of Wide Awake should be regardedas unconstitutional.
My primaryinteresthere,however,is in the adjudicativestratand itsfutureimplications.
NeitherJusticeKenegyofRosenberger
nor
O'Connor
state
that
countsas a "test."
Justice
nedy
anything
The neutralityprincipledominates.The Court's strongestargu216

J).

115 S Ct at 2522-24 (opinion of the Court); id at 2526-28 (opinion of O'Connor,

217See note 186.
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mentrunsfromthe cases requiringthatreligiousgroupsbe able
to use facilitieson an equal basis withothergroups.JusticeKennedy reasonsthat physicalfacilitiesrequirepaymentforupkeep,
in principlefrommeeting
thatcomputerfacilitiesare not different
in principlefrom
rooms, that paying printersis not different
The
to
"no
use
facilities.
computer
funding"prinallowinggroups
ciple standsin the wings as a competitor,the Court explaining
The
why that does not render the paymentsunconstitutional.
"neutrality"and "no funding"principlesare not tests because
the opinionsprovideno standardfor settlinga conflictbetween
the two. JusticeO'Connor, at least, is self-consciousabout this.
She not only rejectsa Grand UnifiedTheory,as she puts it, she
does not offerany explicitformulaforresolvingcases withinthis
discretedomain. For the foreseeablefuture,we can expect the
Court to followthis patternin some cases, relyingin otherson
some narrowtest,such as the one about endorsement.
What does Rosenberger
presageforaid to religiousorganizations?
In Bowenv Kendrick,218
the Court upheld federalfundingforreligious organizationsamong groups giving instructionin family
planning,concludingthatthe fundswerefora propersecularpurpose and thatgovernment
supervisionneed not be undulyentanDoes
step-that directaid
signala huge further
gling.
Rosenberger
forreligiousactivitiesis now permissible?That depends.Government fundinggoing to churches,as churches,and not to other
remainsunconstitutional.
Suppose,
privateassociationsdefinitely
that
associations
are all treatedsimilarly.Recent
however,
private
the writingsof Robert
literaturein politicalscience,particularly
Putnam,219suggeststhatliberaldemocracyis healthiestwhen priThe privateassociationsin whichAmerivateassociationsflourish.
cans are mostactiveare religiousones. In orderto encouragecivic
the government
participation,
mightfundall privateassociations,
allowing them to use funds to promote their own purposes.
Churcheswould receivesupportas one kindof privateassociation,
Jususing fundstheyreceiveforchurchpurposes.In Rosenberger,
218487 US 589
(1988). Many scholarshave believedthatBowenmayevidencea shiftin
favorof aid to parochialschools. See, e.g.,JesseH. Choper, Separation
ofChurchand State:
"New" Directions
bythe "New" SupremeCourt,34 J Church & State 363, 368-70 (1992);
Ira C. Lupu (cited in note 76) at 765-66.
211
See, e.g., RobertD. Putnam,BowlingAlone:America'sDecliningSocialCapital,6 J Democracy65 (1995). See also Glendon and Yanes (cited in note 76) at 501.
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tice Thomas indicatesthathe believesfundingreligiousorganizationsneutrallywithothergroupsis constitutionally
acceptable.220
That no otherJusticejoined his opinion probablyindicatesthat
none is now willingto committo thatposition.JusticeO'Connor's
about decidingconflictsof principle
opinion,fullof reservations
in contextand about the special natureof the university
fee and
its programof support,shows she would reject fundingchurch
activitiesfromtax revenues.JusticeKennedy's opinion for the
Court is also contextualand qualified.221
When we join Rosenberger
to the opinionsin KiryasJoelof the
previousterm,we can be sure thata relaxationof limitson aid to
parochialeducationis in store.One would expectthe fiveJustices
who acceptedfinancingof religiousspeech in universities
to look
on
to
assistance
directed
the
secular
functions
of
favorably
religious
schools,along withotherprivateschools.A Court on whichmost
withAguilarwill worryless
Justiceshave expresseddisagreement
thanthe Court once did both about potentialreligiouseffectsand
about administrative
supervision.
and cases in whichstudentsreceiving
Finally,givenRosenberger
for
money specializedpurposes,such as educationforthe blind,222
I predictthat
have been allowed to choose religiousinstitutions,
what are called "voucherprograms"forschool educationwill be
in which
sustained,even if a significant
percentageof institutions
use
vouchers
In
a
are
voucher
parents
religious.223
typical
program,
parentswould be givencreditsto pay forschools of theirchoice.
This elementof voluntarismsupportsconstitutionality.
Since the
vastmajorityof privateschoolsare religious,mostvouchermoney
going to privateschools would go to religiousschools. That element has been thoughtto rendervoucherprogramsvulnerable,
in Rosenberger
and the disquiet
but boththe emphasison neutrality
withAguilarpoint towardacceptanceof a voucherprogramthat
implementsparentalchoice and treatsall privateschools equally.
220115

S Ct at 2528-33. The opinionis primarily
focussedon Madison's position.
Of course,some Justicesmay have acceptedqualifications
theydo not regardas significantin orderto achievea majorityopinion.
222
Witters
v Washington
Dept. ofServices
for theBlind,474 US 481 (1988).
223When I wrote about that subjectsome years ago, the prospectsstruckme as much
more uncertain.Greenawalt,Voucher
Plansand SectarianSchools:The Constitutional
Problem,
in Parents,Teachers,
and Children(InstituteforContemporaryStudies(1977)).
221
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AND DISCRIMINATION

Here I drawthethreadstogetheraboutthecentralproblem
of accommodationin Religion Clause adjudication,askingwhat
limitsthe EstablishmentClause sets on accommodationsthatare
requiredby the Free ExerciseClause or are permissibly
granted
needs
One aspectofthisproblemis whattreatment
bylegislatures.
who
in
are similarlysituated crucialrespects.
to be givenothers
A typicallegislativechoice to accommodatewas made by Congress'sdecisionto adopt a law allowingOrthodoxJewishmilitary
personnelto wear headgearindoorsdespitegeneralmilitaryregulationsto the contrary.224
Most legislativeaccommodationsinvolve
but
from
or
the
conferralof government
laws
benefits,
exemptions
anotherformof legislativeaccommodationrequiresprivateactors
The ReligiousFreedom
to makeconcessionsto religiousclaims.225
RestorationAct is a quasi-constitutional
legislativeact thatsetsup
a compellingintereststandardas a generalprincipleof accommodationforlaws and governmentpractices.
At present,the legal situationis this.Exceptforunemployment
compensationclaimsand (a verysuspiciouscategoryof) hybrids,226
no accommodationis constitutionally
requiredunderthe Free ExerciseClause. A fairlywide rangeexistsforlegislativeaccommodations,and these may sometimesrestrictthe behaviorof private
a broad
actors.The ReligiousFreedomRestorationActconstitutes
of
the
federal
accommodation
principle
governmentand,
against
as well. Federal and
if valid, againststateand local governments
statelegislaturesare freeto makesomefurther
specificaccommoto go
and statecourtsmayinterpretstateconstitutions
dations,227
224 See, responding
to Goldmanv Weinberger,
475 US 503 (1986), National DefenseAuthorizationAct forFiscal Year 1988 and 1989, Pub L No 100-180 ?508, 101 Stat 1019,
1086-87 (codifiedat 100 USC ? 774 (1988)). See also, Sullivan,The Congressional
Response
121 MilitaryL Rev 125 (1988).
to Goldmanv Weinberger,
22SSee, e.g.,Title VII of the Civil RightsAct of 1964,42 USC ? 2000e(j) (1988). Michael
McConnell (citedin note 158), at 712 (1992), suggeststhatlanguagein some recentopinions indicatesthatsuch coercionof privateactorscannotconstituteappropriateaccommodation.I am doubtfulthatthe languagehe citesshouldbe so understood,and in anyevent,
agree withhim thatsome action of thissortshould and would be acceptedas legitimate.
Divisionv Smith,494 US 872 (1990),
226As thefirst
partofthearticleexplains,Employment
leaves theseas the onlysortsof situationsin whicha freeexerciseclaim foran exemption
will succeed.
Act does not protectNativeAmeri227 If,forexample,theReligiousFreedomRestoration
can worshipsitesfromdevelopmentof federalland,Congresscould explicitly
providesuch
protection.
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beyondthe federallaw.228Whetheran accommodationis claimed
to be constitutionally
requiredor is chosen by a legislature,the
Clause restricts
whatis constitutionally
Establishment
permissible.
AlthoughmanyEstablishmentClause cases are about possible
accommodationin one formor another,not all are of this type.
Because neitherCapitolSquare nor Rosenberger
concernsspecial
concessionsto religiousneeds,229neitherprovidesmuch guidance
whensuchconcessionsare permitted.
Older cases,however,afford
a tolerableidea of the Court's direction.
A. DISCRIMINATION

BeforeI addresscore principlesgoverningpermissibleaccommodation,I considera perplexingproblemthathauntsthissubject:
If a special concessionis made to some religious
discrimination.
in comparison.It clarifiesanalysisto recclaims,othersmaysuffer
four
that
at
least
different
ognize
groupsmaybe put at a disadvantage: (1) similarreligiousclaimants,(2) similarnonreligiousclaimthe same act or getthe
ants,(3) personswho wouldliketo perform
same benefit,(4) personswho maybear theburdenof the granted
exemptionor benefitin a different
way.230For example,an exemption frommilitaryservicemightbe limitedto membersof pacifist
groups, thus treatingless favorablyother religiouspacifists;it
mightbe limitedto religiousconscientiousobjectors,treatingless
favorably
nonreligiousconscientiousobjectors;it mightbe limited
to conscientiousobjectors,treatingless favorablyall those who
would preferto avoid militaryserviceforotherreasons.Any exemption might harm the broader public if militarydefenseis
compromised.
I concentrateinitiallyon the firsttwo kindsof discrimination,
228
Actmaynotrequirewhatthestateconstitution
The ReligiousFreedomRestoration
doesbecause(1) theact is interpreted
notto do so, or (2) it is heldinvalidas it applies
to stateandlocalgovernments.
229
hasa somewhat
broadernotionof
McConnell(citedin note158),at 686,apparently
circumstances
"whenthegovernment
has extended
benefits
or
accommodation,
covering
toparallel
secularconcerns.
services
orgroups
.. ." Iftheonlyreasonwhyreligious
persons
notgeta benefit
isbecausetheyarereligious
andtheynonetheless
receive
thebenefit,
might
I do notconsider
theextension
tobe an accommodation.
Ifpeoplegeta benefit
forvarious
secularreasons(suchas ill health),
andarethengivenit fora specifically
reason
religious
whileothersecularreasonsremainunavailing,
thatis a formof
conscience),
(religious
accommodation.
230See generally
Laycock(citedin note184)at 431-32.
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discriminationamong religiouspersons and discriminationbetween religiouspersons and otherwisesimilarnonreligiousperis constitutionally
sons. If a kind of discrimination
forbidden,it
does not necessarilyfollowthataccommodationis forbidden.One
is thataccommodationmaybe made to membersof one
possibility
of anothergroupmightthenacquire a constitumembers
group;
whena classificationalrightto the same treatment.231
Ordinarily,
in
v
in
is
as
Larson
tion amongreligions,
Valente,232 whichone religious groupreceivedless favorabletaxregulationthanothers,the
Court appliesa stringent
compellinginteresttest.Should the apif
be
different
an
accommodation
forthe favoredgroupis
proach
constitutionally
requiredor grantedby a legislature?Let us supthat
the
second
groupwantsand needsan exemptionas much
pose
as thefavoredgroup,butthe state'sinterestin denyingthe exemption to the second group is strongerthan its interestin denying
it to thefavoredgroup.This could happen,forexample,ifa group
whose beliefsand practicesare likethoseof theAmishhas no historyof successfulcommunitycare for membersand a high rate
of departureof young people. Under the ordinaryfree exercise
compellinginteresttest,this groupmightlose; should it win because the Amishhave an exemptionand any religiousdifferentiation mustmeet the more stringentcompellinginteresttest?The
court has never faced such a case. The Amishexemptionshould
affectthe othergroup'sclaim in a positiveway.The government
needs more powerfulreasonsto denyan exemptionif othersreceive it, thoughthe test should be less stringentthan the strict
One relevantfactorshouldbe
scrutinycompellinginteresttest.233
in some waybecause
whetherthe unfavoredgroupactuallysuffers
the benefitgoes to the favoredgroup.
When thestatecan favorreligiousgroupsand personsovernonThree dissenting
Justicesrereligiousones is more controversial.
garded thatas an appropriateaccommodationin Welshv United
was unconstituStates;234
JusticeHarlan believedthedifferentiation

231
232

See, e.g., McConnell (cited in note 158) at 708.

456 US 228 (1982).

233
in Constitutional
as a Concept
1 discussedthisproblemin Greenawalt,Religion
Law, 72
betweenconstitutionally
Cal L Rev 753, 799-800 (1984). I thenfounda distinction
required
accommodationsand those grantedby legislativechoice more relevantthan I do now.
234 398 US 333, at 369 (White,J, dissenting)
(1970).
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torturedthestatutory
tional;235and thefourJusticesin theplurality
issue.236
to
the
constitutional
avoid
JusticeHarlan's anlanguage

swer seems rightforconscientiousobjectors:with an individualreasonexists
ized screeningprocessforall claimants,no sufficient
for denyingexemptionsto nonreligiouspersons conscientiously
in war. Imagine,however,an exemption
opposed to participation
who
to
use
given persons
peyoteas a sacramentin worship.Constitutionalprincipleshould not require that the exemptionbe
extendedto those who use peyote as the centerof nonreligious
meetings.237To do so would require courts to make impossible
judgmentsbetweengroupsthathave deep beliefsaboutthevirtues
of peyoteand those that merelyenjoy use, betweengroupsthat
are genuinelyunifiedand those whose only connectingthreadis
on personaluse of peyote.In brief,
a wish to evade restrictions
the religiousclausesyieldno rigidgeneralrule about distinctions
of thiskind
betweenreligionsand nonreligious;some distinctions
should be accepted,othersrejected.
is to
Althoughtheusual remedyforunacceptablediscrimination
put the complaininggroup in the same position as the favored
is to withhold(or invalidate)anybenefitsfor
group,an alternative
the favoredgroup. Complex variationson this latterpossibility
have seemedrelevantto some membersof the Court in two modcases. They have regardedthe
ern freeexerciseand establishment
for
a
not to granta freeexercise
discrimination
as
reason
potential
claim and to conclude that a statuteviolated the Establishment
Clause.
The freeexerciseclaim was Dr. Goldman's argumentthat he
shouldbe allowedto wearhisyarmulkeindoors.238
JusConcurring
tices pointed out that if Dr. Goldman succeeded, membersof
other religiousgroups,such as Sikhs with Turbans, and Rastafarianswithdreadlocks,mightdemandsimilartreatment,
and their
claimswould raisemoreseriousproblems.239
Brennan's
disJustice
sent arguedthat such claimscould be reviewedwhen theyarose
235398
236

US at 357-58 (Harlan,J,concurring).

398 US 333.

237I assumethatpeyoteis sufficiently
attractive
as a drugforrecreationaluse to raisethe
problemsI discuss.
238 Goldman
v Weinberger,
475 US 503 (1986).
239Id at 510-13 (Stevens,J,concurring,
joined by White,J,and Powell,J).
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under appropriatestandards,regardinghealth,degree of disturbance,etc.240
JusticeBrennanalso pointedout thattheAirForce's
existingstandards,which allowed the wearingof some kinds of
favored
jewelry,and of items thatwere out of sight,effectively
Christians,because they allowed items that Christianstend to
wouldhaveno greaterprivileges
wear.And,ofcourse,Sikhofficers
if Dr. Goldman's claim were denied than if his claim succeeded
and theirsubsequentclaim failed;theywould not be allowed to
wear turbansin eitherevent.241
Is thereanythingto the worryof the concurring
Justices?Part
of what troubledthem is that two groupsmightconceivablybe
whentheonlydifference
betweenthemwas the
treateddifferently,
to
which
what
would
wear
would
be startlingor out
they
degree
of the ordinary.Bettertreatmentfor the more "familiar"group
would reinforceconventionalattitudes.Althoughthe existingregulationsimplicitlydid that to some extent(favoringChristians),
theirtermsdid not requiredirectjudgmentsabout social acceptance of dress.The idea thatcourtsmightmake such judgments
when applyingfreeexerciserightsis troubling.But the problem's
in Goldmanwas flimsy.The Justicesdid not
factualformulation
numbersof membersof otherreligiousgroups
knowif significant
at odds withmilitary
had dressrequirements
regulationsand simiin
lar to theJewishyarmulkeexcept the degreeof disturbance
they
few
their
a
such
could
be
cause.
identified,
(If
only
persons
might
claimsmightbe grantedwithoutmuchoveralleffect.242)
In context,
thisreasonto denyDr. Goldman'sclaimswas weak;wereit much
morepowerful,
it mightconstitutean interestsufficiently
compelor
for
to
a
free
exercise
become
the
claim,
deny
government
ling
a separateingredientof the constitutional
analysis.
was
The EstablishmentClause use of potentialdiscrimination
more puzzling.In KiryasJoel,someJusticesassertedthatone reason to treata legislativeaccommodationto theneeds of an Orthowas because the legislature
dox Jewishsect as an establishment
240Id at 513-24.
241
If Sikhswere in competitionwithOrthodoxJewsforreligiousallegiance,theycould
be put at a disadvantageby the benefitgivento OrthodoxJews.I assume fewpeople are
choosingbetweenbeing a Sikh and an OrthodoxJew.
242It is no doubtconceivablethatif a
rightto wear turbanswere established,more Sikhs
would sign up forthe Americanarmedforces.
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mightnot benefitsimilargroups in the same way.243 Failing a
showingthatothersimilargroupsexisted,and giventhepossibility
claim for
that any that arose could make a strongconstitutional
thiswas a weak basis to regardthe legislative
equal treatment,244
action as impermissible.
B. STANDARDS OF ACCOMMODATION

I nowturnto thecorequestion
ofwhatkindsofaccommodalikethatin Yoder,
tionsarepermissible.
Manyaccommodations,
from
a
involve
others
confer
exemptions ordinary
requirements;
for
as
when
the
bebenefit,
positive
government
pays chaplains
from
service
removes
their
relicausemilitary
personnel
ordinary
giouslife.245
lineregarding
accommodation
is beThe mostfundamental
of
on
tweenthepermissible
burdens
exercise
and
lifting
religious
ofreligion.246
animpermissible
asLemon's
terms
Insofar
promoting
about
line,itslanguage
helpedat all to drawtheconstitutional
notpromoting
oradvancing
wasthekey.The
government
religion
to
cannot
one
people join religious
government encourage
group,
ingeneral;
orreligious
itcannot
aimtoenhance
thestature
groups
ofonereligious
others.
groupvis-a-vis
is whether
anaccommodation
Another
consideration
important
a
burden
on
others
who
wouldlikethe
places disproportionate
it orwhopaythecostofan acsamebenefit
anddo notreceive
Estate
Thornton
v Caldor,
anapt
commodation.247
Inc.248
provides
of
example. Connecticutrequiredemployersto allow employeesa
dayoffon theirsabbath.Most employeeswouldprefernot to work

243 BoardofEducation
ofKiryasJoel Villagev Grumet,114 S Ct 2481, 2491-92 (opinion
of the Court), 2497-98 (O'Connor, J, concurring)(1994).
The Justicesexpressedconcernthatif the legislaturefailedto granta similarschool
244
districtto a like group,judicial reliefwould be unavailable.
245See
Lupu (cited in note 76) at 749-50; McConnell (note 158) at 686.
246
Inc. v Bullock,489 US 1 (pluralityopinion of Brennan,J)
See, e.g., Texas Monthly,
(1989); McConnell (cited in note 158) at 696-702.
247
v Bullock,489 US at 14-15 (pluralityopinionof Brennan,J), discussed
TexasMonthly
in McConnell (cited in note 158) at 702-03. Not all accommodationsinvolvea cost to
others.For example,membersof a religiousgroup might,at theirown risk,be relieved
fromsafetyrequirementsthataffectonly themselves.
248

472 US 703 (1985).
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If employers
andSunday.249
accedeto sabbathobseron Saturday
withseniority
whowantthosedaysoffwillend
vance,employees
or Sunday.Further,
whenemployers
canon Saturday
up working
shiftpersonnel
the
cost
of
accommodatnotconveniently
around,
ingsabbathdaysoffwillfallon them.The Courtdecidedthatthe
to recognizesabbathobservance
imposedtoo
rigidrequirement
a
burden
on
and
thus
violated
the
Establishment
others,
great
Clause.
Permissibleaccommodations
are more comfortably
distinif
can
from
promotions judges conceptualimpermissible
guished
ize differences
ratherthanrelying
on matters
ofdegree.Unfortuburdenis one of degree.
nately,the notionof disproportionate
minorimposiGiventheaimofaccommodating
exercise,
religious
and otheremployees
be
tionson employers
almay acceptable,250
law
rendered
it
of
the
Connecticut
the
though majorimpositions
unconstitutional.
The distinction
betweenlifting
burdens
andpromoting
religion
is partlyone of conceptual
butit also can depend
differentiation,
ofdegree.One mustbe ableto discern
someburden
on judgments
on religion251
fromwhichan accommodation
providesrelief,and
a
decision
held
invalid
tax
relief
limitedto relito
that
according
be
to
the
"burden"
cannot
mere
susceptibility
giouspublications,
A relecostsimposedon all thoseengagedin similaractivities.2s2
thereligiousclaimants
whoobtainrelief
vantburdenmustaffect
in a wayit does notaffect
mostothers.
a
constitutes
of a burden"can oftenbe highly
What
"lifting
Is directgeneralaid to parochialschools,including
controversial.
The
a permissible
accommodation?
aid to religiousobjectives,
Courthas alwayssaid"no," on thebasisthatsuchaid has an imeffect
of promoting
religion.Much dependson how
permissible
mightslide towardconscientious
249" am passingoverthe pointthatpersonalpreference
nonreligiousbelief:"I believe it is a matterof my obligationas a parentnot to workon
days of the week when my childrenare home fromschool."
250Federallaw (see note 225) requiresemployersto make "reasonableaccommodations"
to religiouspracticesthatdo not cause undue hardship;the SupremeCourt has considered
rathermodesthardshipsto be "undue." See TWA v Hardison,432 US 63 (1977). (I worked
and thedesiredaccomon an amicuscuriaebriefarguingthatthestatutewas constitutional
modationreasonable.)
in maintainingan organizationand meetingcompetitiondo
251 Ordinarycosts inherent
not qualifyas burdens.
Inc. v Bullock,489 US 1 (1989).
252TexasMonthly,
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one views the public schools. If one thinkschildrenhave merely
a privilegeto attendnonpublicschools,the Court'sanalysison this
point sounds right,but suppose one thinksparentshave a fundamentallibertyto sendchildrento religiousschoolsiftheirreligious
consciencesso guide them.253
Since theseparentspay school taxes,
one may believe the state should compensate
them for havingto
schools
cannot
(in conscience)use, byassistingthe
they
support
educationtheymust use. On this view, aid to parochialschools
does not look so different
fromYoder.254
No easycategorizationof
versus
impermissible
promotion
permissiblecompensationresolves
thisproblem;a deeper analysisis required.255
For manyotherproblems,mattersof degreeare highlyrelevant
to whethera burdenis being liftedor religionis beingpromoted.
Work exemptionsforsabbathobservance,again,yield an illustration.256Let us supposethatchurch(or equivalent)membershipeitheris necessaryto get the benefitof thestatelaw or considerably
one's claim to want a day offforthe sabbath.If the
strengthens
benefitsof sabbathobservanceare slight,fewwilljoin
employment
a religionto acquirethem,but mattersmaybe different
ifthe law
assuresa day off.A new employeewho has had a Christianupbringingand continuesto have Christianbeliefs,butis not a member of a church,maybe temptedto join a churchifshe has a job
with a retailoutletthatrequiresmost junior employeesto work
on Saturdayand Sunday. She knowsthat churchesdo not take
attendanceand that no state agencywill check how she spends
mostSundays;even ifshe attendschurchoccasionally,
she will have
mostSundaysfreeforrecreation.The benefitof an assuredweekend day offmay encouragepeople to join churches,synagogues,
etc., althoughthis modest and unintendedeffectof promotion
should probablynot be enough to renderthe law invalid.
The Amoscase257suggestsanotherway in which degree could
253See Michael W. McConnell, The Selective
and Religious
FundingProblem:Abortions
Schools,104 Harv L Rev 989 (1991); Levinson(cited in note 207) at 998-1007.
254Interestingly,
thisrationalemightindicatethatlegislaturescould aid religiousschools
withoutaidingnonreligiousprivateschools.
255
1 believe thatsuch aid should not be viewedas a permissibleaccommodation.
256One defenseof the resultin EstateofThornton
has been thatthe extremeinattention
to the interestsof employersand otheremployeesdemonstrates
thatthe legislature'sambitionwas to promotereligionratherthanlifta burden.See Nuechterlain(citedin note 182)
at 1141-43.
257
Corporation
ofthePresiding
Bishopv Amos,483 US 327 (1987).
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The Court unanimouslydecidedthatCongresshad
be important.
made an acceptableaccommodationin allowingreligiousorganizawithrespectto all jobs in nonprofitendeavtionsto discriminate
church
a
ors.258Suppose
organizationis the main employerin a
Its powerto discriminate
on religiousgrounds,ifexercommunity.
bolsterits abilityto win ostensibleadherence
cised,wouldstrongly
fromemployeesand prospectiveemployees.Essentiallythe same
kind of concessionmightseem to move frombeing a desirable
accommodationto a forbiddenreligiouspromotionif the degree
of assistancewere large enough.259
The demiseofLemonmayenhanceawarenessthateasycategorical analysisfailsto resolvemanyissuesabout accommodation,but
thatawarenessdoes not byitselfyieldnoveltechniquesfordrawing
necessarylines.The workoftheCourtoverthepastyearssuggests
thattheJusticesmaybe fairlystingyabout whataccommodations
are requiredundera generalstandardlike the ReligiousFreedom
RestorationAct; but theywill not decide thatmanyaccommodaClause.
tionslegislaturesgrantare precludedbythe Establishment
V.

CONCLUSION

If we stepback fromnarrowerdoctrinalissues,how can we
understandthe SupremeCourt's presentpositionwithrespectto
the ReligionClauses? It helps to enumeratefivebasic positions,260
and one relatedfree speech approach.(1) The Court mightbe
strongon establishmentand weak on free exercise,forbidding
fundingand other benefitsfor religiousorganizations,declaring
that no exemptionsfor religiousindividualsand groups are required by the Free Exercise Clause and that few are permitted.
258
JusticeWhite'smajorityopiniontreatedit as dispositivethatthe statutemerelyallowed
Since thestatuteexemptedtheseorganizationsfrom
religiousorganizationsto discriminate.
a requirement
thatappliedto everyoneelse, the majority'sgroundunderstated
severelythe
on the
forthe discrimination.
The concurring
Justicesdiffered
responsibility
government's
point.They perceiveda genuineconflictof freeexerciseclaims:the churchorganization's
claim to autonomyand the individualemployee'sfreedomto make his own religious
judgment.
259
Probablya properconstitutional
analysiswould accept the applicationof a statuteif
its effectin most communitieswould not involvesuch substantialassistance.
260Ira Lupu (cited in note 76), at 780, outlinesfourof thesepositions.See also Choper
(note 218) at 363-65; Glendon and Yanes (note 76) at 477-78; Suzanna Sherry,Lee v
Weisman:ParadoxRedux,1992 SupremeCourt Review 123, 129.
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JusticeStevensis close to this view. (2) The opposite approach
would be forthe Court to be strongon freeexerciseand weak on
establishment,
requiringand allowingmanybenefitsto religious
claimants,rarelyfindingthatassistanceamountedto an establishment. No one on the modern court has adopted this stance.
(3) The Court could (at least tryto) be strongon both establishment and freeexercise,holdingmuch assistanceto be forbidden
and many exemptionsto be required.This positionleaves little
to legislativediscretion,because the special treatmentreligious
groupsseek would usuallybe demandedby freeexerciseor preThis positionfaces the greatestdifficluded by establishment.261
cultyin drawingthe line betweenthose two categories,because
amountsto requiredaccommodationor imperalmosteverything
missible promotion. AlthoughJusticesBrennan and Marshall
joined opinionsrejectingfreeexerciseclaims,theycame closer to
thisbasicpositionthanothermodemrn
Justices.(4) The Courtcould
be weak on both establishment
and freeexercise,rejectingclaims
of bothsorts.This position,takenby ChiefJusticeRehnquist,Justice Scalia, and probablyJusticeThomas, leaves a great deal to
legislativediscretion.For those who believe that the Religion
and thatcourtsshouldbe actively
Clauses are countermajoritarian
involvedin markingout thelimitsoftreatment
ofreligiouspersons
and groups,thissurrenderto legislaturesis a seriousdrawback.262
(5) The Court could interpretthe ReligionClauses as mandating
forthereligiousand thenonreligious.
Justice
equalityoftreatment
O'Connor's emphasison endorsementas a crucialestablishment
standardpointsin thisdirection,thoughshe also thinksthatsome
and that a "no fundexemptionsare constitutionally
required263
tax
dollars
mostreligiousactivfor
ing" principleprecludesusing
ities.
The relatedfreespeechapproachis the principleof "no content
When thatcomesintoplay,as it did in both Capidiscrimination."
tolSquare and Rosenberger,
it demandsan "equal treatment"outvaluessupportexcludingreligious
come unless"no-establishment"
261See Lupu (cited in note 76) at 780.
262See, e.g., Glendon and Yanes (cited in note 76) at 530-31; Karst (note 203) at 511.
263
Of course,some exemptionsforminoritiesmaybe seen as necessaryto put themon
an equal footingwithdominantgroupswhose interestsare betterrespectedby legislatures.
See generallyLaycock (cited in note 168) on different
versionsof neutrality.
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speech,or freeexercisevalueswarrantgivingit special benefits.264
The principleof "no contentdiscrimination"
fitswell with the
the
treatment
to
equal
approach
ReligionClauses,and bothreflect
the modernemphasison equalityin constitutionaladjudication.
with other
But the freespeech principlealso workscomfortably
Clause
Scalia
has
been
of
itsstrongone
Justice
Religion
positions.
est proponents.265
When theprincipleis relevant,it restricts
choice
the
branches.
Scalia's
basic
Thus, althoughJustice
by
political
position on the Religion Clauses leaves greatlatitudeto legislative
and executivejudgment,he foundthe administrative
choices in
A rigorousapplicabothoflastterm'scases to be unconstitutional.
tion of the freespeech principlecan similarlyaffectoutcomesunder the otherbasic positionsI have sketched.
Both Employment
Divisionv Smith and the abandonmentof
in part,a movementawayfromrobustinterpretaLemonrepresent,
tions of the two Religion Clauses, underwhichreligionmustbe
treatedas special (eitherin receivingexemptionsor in not receiving aid), and towardprinciplesof equal treatmentand legislative
discretion.If I am rightabout the prospectsforschool aid, this
movementwill be cashed out in approvalof muchmore extensive
financialassistanceto privatereligiousschoolsthanhas previously
been accepted.For some othersignificant
areas,the shiftin doctrinalfocusand overallpositionwillhavemuchless practicaleffect.
One of those areas is symbolicspeech on governmentproperty.
At least forthe timebeing,the endorsementinquiry,whichtook
hold in the latteryearsof Lemon'srule,continuesto prevail.Lee
v Weismanshowsthata majorityof the Court has no inclination
to revisitthe still controversialsubjectsof (vocal) school prayer
and devotionalbible reading.If an invocationand benedictionat
a single graduationceremonyinvolveunacceptablecoercion and
endorsement,daily devotionsin the classroomundoubtedlydo.
law
The onlyavenueforoverturning
thisbranchof establishment
would be constitutional
amendment.
For freeexercise,as I have said,the issuesare sharper.Congress
in the broadestway,to comhas triedto implementits discretion,
264
The formerclaim failedin CapitolSquare and Rosenberger;
the latterclaim failedin
TexasMonthly,
Inc. v Bullock,489 US 1 (1989).
265
This is most powerfully
exemplifiedby his opinion forthe Court in R.A.V v Cityof
St. Paul, 505 US 377 (1992).
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mandjudicialattentionto religiousclaimants.If it succeeds,courts
will haveto be sensitiveto impingements
on religiousexercise,not
as a matterof directconstitutional
but in applying
interpretation
the Religious Freedom RestorationAct. Should the Court hold
theact to be valid,thecontinuingtaskof delineatingwhenpossible
accommodationsto religiousexerciseviolate the Establishment
Clause will become more exigent.In that issue, more than any
other,lies the heartof Religion Clause interpretation.

